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Panel III: Reaching Goals:
Choosing Strategies and Issues for Advancement
Gay People, Trans People, Women:
Is It All About Gender?
Chai R. Feldblum*
Gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals confound ordinary gender
stereotypes because we are sexually attracted to people of the same
gender. But apart from that particular form of gender "non-con-
formity," many gay people consider themselves to be very gender
conforming. Indeed, many gay people do not view themselves as
particularly different from mainstream America, apart from that
"minor" point regarding their choice of sex partners. Thus, a signif-
icant number of gay people might well presume they fit more within
mainstream America, than, for example, an individual who was des-
ignated as male at birth, but who now lives as a heterosexual
woman.
* Professor of Law, Director, Federal Legislation Clinic, Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center. I want to thank Lisa Mottet, not only for her research help
and her work on trans issues generally, but also for nudging me so effectively to
write this essay. The first part of this essay captures one aspect of seven intense
years of working on the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), and I
wish to thank a number of people who played major roles in that effort. Nancy
Buermeyer is one of the unsung heroes of the gay political movement, and of
ENDA in particular, and I am grateful to have been able to work with her over the
past decade. Elizabeth Birch was always supportive of my work, and she worked
superbly with Daniel Zingale, the magnificent public policy director of HRC. Jes-
sica Xavier and Sharon Stuart taught me and my research assistant Erin Leveton
most of what we knew about transgender issues as of 1996; Dana Priesing and Riki
Wilchins carried on the job of education and prodding. Kerry Lobel and Rebecca
Isaacs of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force helped me realize my dream of
creating a legislative lawyering project at a gay rights organization, and were won-
derful friends and colleagues during their tenure at NGLTF. Finally, I owe a spe-
cial debt of gratitude to Shannon Minter and Jennifer Levi. As I say in the piece, it
is only by knowing transgender people that one's heart and mind can truly be
changed. My personal commitment to equality for transgender people, and my
conceptual understanding of the issues, owe much to early conversations with
Shannon, and to continuing conversations with both Shannon and Jennifer. And
thank you, Anne Lewis, for supporting me through all my passions.
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Of course, many gay people do not match the stereotype of
what the general public expects men and women to look like. In-
deed, the greater visibility of butch-femme couples within the les-
bian community confirms both realities. A large number of
lesbians are very gender-conforming (all those femmes and all that
lipstick... ), while other lesbians may often be mistaken as male by
those with whom they come into contact. And, of course, plenty of
lesbians and gay men are adrogynous-looking, neither embracing
nor opposing gender stereotypes.
As a legal matter, however, prohibitions of discrimination
based on sexual orientation have rarely engaged with the issue of
gender non-conformity. In most state and local gay rights laws and
ordinances, and in the federal employment non-discrimination bill
(the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, or ENDA), "sexual ori-
entation" is defined as "homosexuality, heterosexuality, and bisexu-
ality, whether real or perceived."' Thus, protection is extended to
an individual based on the sexual orientation of the individual (i.e.,
whom the individual is oriented to have sex with), and has nothing
to do with the gender identity or gender expression of the individ-
ual. Of course, if an employer, based on the individual's gender
identity or expression, perceives that individual as wishing to have
sex with a person of the same gender, then that individual is pro-
tected as someone "perceived" to be homosexual. 2
A few gay rights theorists have long pointed out that discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation can be conceived of as
I See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1999, H.R.2355, 106th
Cong. (1999).
2 Sexual orientation, of course, is more than about desiring "sex with" an-
other person. In truth, it is about the desire to be intimate with, have pleasure
with, and perhaps spend a lifetime with, a person of the same sex or the opposite
sex. For example, a heterosexual person is not only a person who wishes to have
"sex with" a person of the opposite sex, but also presumably someone who wishes
to have his or her emotional, intimate, and perhaps daily life, shared with a person
of the opposite sex. There are many married, heterosexual couples who have sex
quite rarely, if at all, but who still view themselves (in my view, correctly) as heter-
osexual. That is because they are intimate with someone of the opposite sex, and
because, if they did have sex, it would be with someone of the opposite sex (hope-
fully, their spouse, albeit not necessarily). The same holds true for gay men and
lesbians. Thus, although I say in this piece that sexual orientation refers to "whom
the individual is oriented to have sex with," I mean to include in that phrase the
broader aspects of intimacy and emotional connection that usually are concomitant
with sexual activity.
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discrimination based on sex. 3 But those of us who play primarily in
the legislative or litigation arenas have largely ignored the practical
applications of that insight. In this brief essay, I want to consider
whether it makes sense for gay rights legislative advocates and liti-
gators to continue to downplay the gender non-conformity aspects
of gay sexual orientation.4
My involvement in this area, and the growth in my conceptual
thinking, stem directly from my role in drafting and negotiating the
3 See, e.g., Mark Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Story-
telling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay
Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1992); Samuel Marcosson, Harassment on the
Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81
GEO. L.J. 1 (1992); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians
and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Francisco
Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of
"Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society,
83 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1995). See also Ruth Colker, Bi: Race, Sexual Orientation,
Gender and Disability, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1995). For additional, more recent
writings, see, e.g., Paisley Currah, Defining Genders: Sex and Gender Non-con-
formity in the Civil Rights Strategy of Sexual Minorities, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1363
(1997); Robert Wintemute, Recognising New Kinds of Direct Sex Discrimination:
Transsexualism, Sexual Orientation and Dress Codes, 60 MOD. L. R. 334 (1997);
Theodore Schroeder, Fables of the Deconstruction: The Practical Failures of Gay
and Lesbian Theory in the Realm of Employment Discrimination, 6 AM. U. J.
GENDER & L. 333 (1998); Jennifer Nevins, Getting Dirty: A Litigation Strategy for
Challenging Sex Discrimination Law by Beginning with Transsexualism, 24 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 383 (1998); Jennifer Nye, The Gender Box, 13 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 226 (1998); Toni Lester, Protecting the Gender Nonconformist
From the Gender Police-Why the Harassment of Gays and Other Gender Noncon-
formist is a Form of Sex Discrimination in Light of Supreme Court's Decision in
Oncale v. Sundowner, 29 N.M. L. REV. 89 (1999).
4 It made sense to ignore the theoretical connection between sexual orienta-
tion and sex discrimination in light of the fact that, throughout the 1970s, courts
uniformly rejected the argument that sexual orientation discrimination was a form
of sex discrimination. See DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.
2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that discrimination based on sexual orientation is
not discrimination based on sex under Title VII); Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel
Commission, 482 N.W. 2d 121 (Wisc. 1992) (holding that discrimination against
same-sex partners in providing employee benefits is not sex discrimination); Baker
v. Nelson, 191 N.W. 2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (holding that denying same-sex couples
the right to marry is not sex discrimination under the Constitution), appeal dis-
missed for want of substantial federal question, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). However, the
argument that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination has been ac-
cepted in more recent decisions. See infra note 73. The question this essay deals
with is whether changes in judicial trends, and changes in society's view of gender,
make it worthwhile for us to reconsider our legislative and litigation strategies.
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provisions of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), a
bill that prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in pri-
vate employment. 5 Thus, the first part of this essay reviews activi-
ties that occurred between 1993 and 2001 regarding coverage of
gender identity in ENDA. In an appendix to the essay, I include a
number of primary materials that were written during this time pe-
riod. I include these documents both to provide background for my
comments in this essay, as well as to help preserve a historical re-
cord of a fascinating and controversial issue of our times. In the
latter half of this essay, I review trends in the case law that I believe
should cause us to rethink some of the positions I, and others, took
during this time period.
THE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE: How SHOULD WE PROTECT
GENDER IDENTITY?
In January 1993, I was hired by the Human Rights Campaign
(HRC) to serve as a consultant in drafting an omnibus gay civil
rights bill. For the following year and a half, I worked with a draft-
ing committee established by the Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights, an umbrella organization of civil rights groups, to draft such
a bill. Finally, in June 1994, a gay civil rights bill that covered only
employment (ENDA) was introduced in both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. 6 The definition of "sexual orientation"
in that bill was "lesbian, gay, bisexual, or heterosexual orientation
... as manifested by identity, acts, statements, or associations." '7
ENDA is intended to protect gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, and
heterosexuals who are discriminated against because of their choice
of sexual partner. This group includes individuals whose gay iden-
tity is manifested through gender non-conforming behavior. But
5 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1996, S. 2056, 104th Cong.
(1996); Employment Non-Discrimination Act, of 1995, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong.
(1995); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, H.R.4636, 103rd Cong.
(1994).
6 See Chai R. Feldblum, The Federal Gay Civil Rights Bill.- From Bella to
ENDA, in CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS
149 (John D'Emilio et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter CREATING CHANGE]. A compre-
hensive description of the evolution of ENDA under the auspices of the Leader-
ship Conference on Civil Rights drafting committee may be found in that article.
7 Employment Non-Discrimination Act, S. 2238, 103rd Cong. (1994). The
definition was later changed to "homosexuality, heterosexuality, and bisexuality,
whether such orientation is real or perceived." See Employment Non-Discrimina-
tion Act of 1995, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995).
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ENDA is not intended to protect an individual who experiences dis-
crimination solely because of a change in his or her gender status.
Our decision to restrict the non-discrimination coverage of
ENDA in this manner was quite deliberate. During drafting of the
bill, two questions arose regarding the scope of the bill. First,
should people who experience discrimination based on marital sta-
tus be covered under the bill? Second, should people who experi-
ence discrimination based on transgender status be covered? In
both cases, our answer was no.
With regard to marital status, we recognized that gay people
could not legally be married in any state, and hence that marital
status discrimination was of significant concern to gay people. That
is, an employer could decide to deny promotions to any non-mar-
ried employee, and that would have a significant adverse effect on
any gay employee. Nevertheless, we decided we could not take on
the larger issue of marital status discrimination in a gay rights bill.
As a strategic matter, the more a bill tries to do, the harder it is to
enact.8 Thus, we decided that prohibiting marital status discrimina-
tion would have to wait for another federal bill.9
With regard to transgender status, we shared the same strategic
concerns that applied to marital status. Moreover, the addition of
transgender status would not only create additional weight for
ENDA to bear (just as marital status would), but it was also weight
that would probably come at significant political cost. Although no
one in the drafting group had polled Members of Congress on the
particular question of prohibiting discrimination against trans-
gender individuals, our instinct was that even Members who were
willing to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination would not yet
be willing to prohibit discrimination based on transgender status.'0
Apart from the strategic concern in adding transgender status,
however, we believed that discrimination based on transgender sta-
8 Drafting a good bill is about combining law and politics. See Feldblum,
Five Circles of Effective Advocacy, and The Concept of Legislative Lawyering,
available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/clinics/flc/fivecircles.html.
9 Of course, if a plaintiff could prove that an employer had used marital
status as a pretext for discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, the em-
ployer would be liable under ENDA.
10 This political judgment was reinforced when, many years later, Rebecca
Isaacs from the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) and I asked the
lead Senate sponsors of ENDA to add coverage of transgender individuals to
ENDA. See infra note 28.
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tus was conceptually different from discrimination based on sexual
orientation. The latter was generated by an employer's discomfort
with the gender of the person that an employee or potential em-
ployee had sex with. The former was generated by an employer's
discomfort with the fact that an employee or potential employee no
longer expressed the gender he or she had been assigned at birth.
One was discrimination based on sexual orientation; the other was
discrimination based on gender. Indeed, we believed discrimination
based on an individual's gender non-conformity, or based on the
fact that an individual was living as a gender different from the one
assigned at birth, was already prohibited under existing sex discrim-
ination laws. The problem was simply that the current laws had not
yet been properly construed to cover situations regarding trans-
gender individuals. 1
As I noted above, even if we had perceived a wonderful con-
ceptual fit between transgender status and sexual orientation, I am
sure we still would not have added transgender status to ENDA's
coverage. In such a case, we would have thought of transgender
status discrimination in the same way we thought of marital status
discrimination. That is, we would have acknowledged the close
confluence between discrimination based on transgender status and
discrimination based on sexual orientation, but we would have still
decided to forgo addressing the former as a strategic matter. Civil
rights law is often a story of incremental protection; and, the trans-
gender issue would have fallen into that pattern. 12
11 The Supreme Court, in 1989, had laid the groundwork for using federal
sex discrimination law to remedy discrimination based on gender non-conformity.
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). At the time of our drafting
sessions in 1993, however, no court had considered whether the reasoning of Price
Waterhouse would extend coverage to transsexuals under Title VII. Federal courts
prior to Price Waterhouse had determined that transsexuals were not protected by
Title VII. See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F. 2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Som-
mers v. Budget Marketing, 667 F. 2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur An-
derson Co., 566 F. 2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
12 For example, people with disabilities first received significant anti-discrim-
ination protection in sections 501-504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973). These federal
provisions covered only the federal government, federal contractors, and programs
that received federal financial assistance. Fifteen years later, people with disabili-
ties received protection against discrimination in the sale and rental of private
housing. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102
Stat. 1619 (1988). Finally, two years later, people with disabilities received more
628 [Vol. XVII
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But, for me, the conceptual difference between discrimination
based on transgender status and discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation was quite real. I believed this difference meant there was
a higher strategic legal cost in adding coverage for transgender sta-
tus to ENDA. That is, if there was a reasonable chance of covering
such discrimination under existing sex discrimination laws, such as
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, then adding protection for
transgender individuals in ENDA would be a short-sighted legal
move. First, if one included such coverage in a new federal bill,
courts would read that action as confirming that coverage did not
already exist under federal sex discrimination law. Second, there
was a high likelihood that coverage of transgender status would
never survive final passage of ENDA. Courts would then use rejec-
tion of the coverage as yet further confirmation that Congress never
wished to extend protection to transgender individuals. Hence, it
would be even more likely that existing sex discrimination law
would not be interpreted as including such coverage.
The introduction of ENDA in July 1994 was a major media
event.13 The visibility of the bill, however, was also a galvanizing
event for members of the transgender community who were furious
at their exclusion from the bill.14 The heightened activism and
politicization of the transgender community, following introduction
of ENDA in 1994, was an essential force in moving the conversation
forward in the gay political and legal community. While I did not
necessarily enjoy being on the receiving end of some of the anger in
the early years, I believe such anger and activism were essential
components for creating necessary change, and I celebrate it for
that.
My initial response, however, when transgender individuals
and organizations posted documents on the web criticizing HRC, as
an organization, and me, as an individual, for the non-inclusion of
transgender individuals in ENDA, was purely defensive. I drafted a
document, entitled "Statement of Chai Feldblum re ENDA and
Discrimination Against Transgender People," and posted it on the
expansive protection in the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
13 See Feldblum, supra note 7, at 179-180.
14 See, e.g., Phyllis Randolph Frye, Facing Discrimination, Organizing for
Freedom: The Transgender Community, in CREATING CHANGE, supra note 7, at
451.
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web in July 1995. (See Appendix A) This document neatly cap-
tures my thinking at the time. The document sets out a legal and
strategic defense for not including transgender status in ENDA, and
calls for achieving better anti-discrimination protection based on
gender identity through litigation under existing sex discrimination
laws.
In the fall of 1995, HRC decided to host a meeting with a num-
ber of the transgender activists to discuss their concerns regarding
ENDA. My role in that meeting was two-fold. First, I wanted to
explain our conceptual distinction between sexual orientation dis-
crimination - which required a new law, ENDA, and discrimina-
tion based on gender identity - which simply required a
reinvigoration of litigation under sex discrimination laws. Second, I
wanted to challenge the assertion made by many transgender activ-
ists that ENDA would not effectively protect butch lesbians and
effeminate gay men who were discriminated against because of
their gender non-conformity. Of course, an employer could try to
avoid liability under ENDA by asserting he had no problem with
hiring lesbians, but simply did not want to hire lesbians who
"looked too male." But, as I explained, I believed such an em-
ployer would still be found liable under ENDA, and if not, would
certainly be found liable under Title VII.15
The meeting at HRC was long and acrimonious. The bottom
line was that sex discrimination laws had not been construed in the
past to cover transgender individuals, and the transgender repre-
sentatives at the meeting were not interested in hanging their hopes
on that tack. The HRC representatives were equally adamant that
it was neither strategically wise, nor conceptually appropriate, to
amend ENDA to include transgender status or gender identity.
Nancy Buermeyer, HRC's lead lobbyist on ENDA, finally pro-
vided the key to ending the impasse. She suggested that HRC
agree not to oppose an amendment that would add gender identity
to ENDA, if such an amendment were offered at any point by a
Member of Congress. In addition, HRC's executive director, Eliza-
beth Birch, agreed I could work over the next few months (as a paid
15 In my view, an employer who fired a lesbian for being "too male" would
either be found to be using the argument that the woman was "too male" as simply
a pretext for discrimination based on sexual orientation (and hence would be liable
under ENDA), or would be found to be discriminating based on gender stereo-
types (and hence would be liable under Title VII).
630 [Vol. XVII
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HRC consultant) with representatives from the transgender com-
munity to help develop a gender identity amendment. Birch, Bu-
ermeyer, and Daniel Zingale, HRC's public policy director, all
emphasized that the organization was not agreeing to include gen-
der identity into ENDA prior to reintroduction of the bill, nor was
HRC committing itself to support any amendment we drafted. 16
Over the following twelve months, a small group of us worked
to develop a gender identity amendment to ENDA. The group con-
sisted of myself, Erin Leveton (a George Washington University
law student who worked with me for school credit and who did the
bulk of the legal research), Jessica Xavier (a Maryland activist on
transgender issues), and Sharon Stuart (a bi-gendered activist from
Connecticut.) Towards the end of the process, Dana Priesing, a
lawyer and activist with a gender rights group, Gender Public Ad-
vocacy Coalition (GenderPAC), joined the effort. 17 The result of
the work was a series of proposed modifications to ENDA. The
proposed textual changes, as well as our accompanying explanation
of the changes, appear in Appendix B. We also presented the
changes in the form of a free-standing bill, entitled The Gender
Identity Non-Discrimination Act (GINDA).
In certain respects, the year-long effort was a disappointment
for members of the transgender community. While we had devel-
oped a legally sound set of recommendations for adding gender
16 Despite clear statements by HRC staff that the organization was not
changing its position on ENDA, at least some participants missed that message.
For example, Phyllis Frye recounts the meeting as follows: "It was a long and an-
ger-filled meeting. HRC agreed to have Jessica Xavier and Sharon Stuart work
with Chai Feldblum on drafting a transgender-inclusive ENDA." See Frye, supra
note 15, at 464. Frye gives no explanation as to why HRC would suddenly change
its position and support a "transgender-inclusive ENDA." Nevertheless, Frye goes
on to recount that "in November of 1996, the next large transgender community
meeting with HRC took place.... The thrust of the meeting was to reposition old
stances. HRC was not going to put us into ENDA. We, on the other hand, were
going to settle for nothing less." Id. at 465. In fact, HRC never changed its posi-
tion between 1995 and 1996. The organization was willing to devote support and
resources to the transgender community, and it was willing to withhold opposition
if an effort to amend ENDA to include gender identity was made. It was never,
however, willing to recommend to the civil rights community, or to ENDA's Con-
gressional sponsors, that ENDA should include gender identity. Id.
17 GenderPAC's mission is described as follows: "The Gender Public Advo-
cacy Coalition (GenderPAC) is a not-for-profit organization, composed of individ-
uals and groups, and dedicated to a broad-based, inclusive national movement for
'gender, affectional, and racial equality.' See www.gpac.org.
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identity to ENDA, the negative political ramifications of making
such an addition had not changed at all. Hence, it is no surprise
that HRC maintained its position in a follow-up meeting with trans-
gender activists in November 1996: HRC would not oppose the
amendment that had been drafted by our small group were such an
amendment to be offered. HRC would not, however, recommend
to the civil rights community, or to ENDA's Congressional spon-
sors, that ENDA be changed to include such an addition.
The year-long effort did, however, make a significant impact
on me. I still agreed with HRC that to recommend that ENDA be
amended to include gender identity was strategically wrong for the
gay community. I also still believed it was legally short-sighted for
the transgender community to seek the inclusion of gender identity
in ENDA, given that such a move might undermine efforts to use
existing sex discrimination laws to prohibit discrimination based on
gender non-conformity. But I had become more personally com-
mitted to fighting the injustice of the current situation: that is, the
lack of effective legal redress for individuals who suffer discrimina-
tion based on gender identity or gender non-conformity.
As a general matter, I felt the gay rights and the women's
rights litigation organizations had a responsibility to devote re-
sources to establishing protection for gender non-conformity - and
ultimately, for transgender status - under existing sex discrimina-
tion laws. To me, it did not seem this was a responsibility the orga-
nizations were carrying out vigorously in their litigation strategies.
Moreover, I felt that if such renewed litigation were not successful,
then the gay community and the women's community had a respon-
sibility to work with the transgender community to amend existing
sex discrimination laws to create explicit protection for gender non-
conformity and gender identity.
My first effort to raise these concerns occurred in the context
of the bi-annual legal roundtable, co-hosted by the Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund (LAMBDA) and the ACLU Lesbian
and Gay Rights Project (ACLU). The legal roundtable consists of
litigators who work at the four major gay rights litigation groups:
LAMBDA, ACLU, NCLR (National Center for Lesbian Rights),
and GLAD. (Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders).' 18 Shan-
non Minter, a lawyer with NCLR, was one of the individuals who
18 There are also a few of us who attend on an invitation basis.
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had been present at both of the HRC meetings with transgender
activists and I had learned much from him over the previous two
years. Shannon and I asked the organizers of the roundtable for a
session devoted to selected issues regarding gender non-conformity.
A session was set aside at the September 1997 roundtable, and
Shannon and I drafted a memo for that session. (The memo ap-
pears as Appendix C.)
Our roundtable memo was carefully designed to address cer-
tain issues, and not others. Shannon and I were not interested in
revisiting the question of whether ENDA should be amended to
include gender identity. Rather, a mainstay of the attacks on
ENDA by the transgender community had been that ENDA would
not adequately protect butch lesbians and effeminate gay men who
experienced discrimination based on their gender non-conformity.
We wanted the litigators who would be faced with these situations
to decide whether ENDA was, in fact, adequate for their needs. In
addition, we wanted to highlight the fact that some gay men and
lesbians experience discrimination largely as a result of their gender
non-conformity, and we believed gay litigation groups should be us-
ing their resources under existing. sex discrimination laws to address
such discrimination.1 9
The roundtable discussion was generally productive. On the
first issue, Shannon argued that gender expression is often a mani-
festation of sexual orientation, and not simply a concomitant side-
product of such orientation. Hence, for example, a lesbian who is
fired for being too butch is, in fact, being fired for being a lesbian -
because for that woman, her butchness is part of her sexual orienta-
tion. I had been skeptical of that argument going into the round-
19 As background for the meeting, Dana Priesing from GenderPAC pre-
pared a memo setting forth a summary of Title VII caselaw with regard to gender
expression and identity, as it existed at that point. Memorandum from Dana Pries-
ing, Gender Expression and Employment Discrimination Under Title VII (1997)
(on file with author).
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table conversation, 20 but I became more convinced of its logic
during the discussion. 2'
Most of the roundtable litigators did not accept the argument
that sexual orientation should be defined as "including a particular
gender projection. '2 2 But those litigators still believed, as a practi-
cal matter, that employers would not escape liability under ENDA
by trying to disaggregate gender expression from sexual orienta-
tion. The bottom line, for these litigators, was that the American
public would simply not be sophisticated enough about either gen-
der expression or sexual orientation to understand an employer's
attempted effort to disconnect the two. Thus, a lesbian fired for
being too male, or a gay man fired for being too effeminate, would
still be viewed by the public as being fired because of his or her
sexual orientation - regardless of what an employer might say.
On the second issue, the roundtable discussion was informative
but not particularly ground-breaking. All the litigators agreed it
would be beneficial if existing sex discrimination laws were more
effectively used to prohibit discrimination based on gender non-
conformity. Moreover, there was general consensus that reaffirm-
ing such a legal principle through a series of cases would redound to
the benefit of those gay men and lesbians who did not conform to
20 In the memo to the roundtable, I had written: "In addition, there are some
interesting conceptual questions around defining sexual orientation as including a
particular gender projection. Shannon thinks a solid theoretical case can be made
for that; Chai is more uncertain about making that argument." Memorandum
from Chai R. Feldblum & Shannon Minter, Title VII, ENDA, and Gender Expres-
sion (1997) (Appendix C).
21 As a femme, I think it was hard for me to conceptualize my femininity as
being part of my sexual orientation. For that reason, I also resisted characterizing a
lesbian's butchness as being part of her sexual orientation. In my mind, one's mas-
culine and feminine characteristics were simply irrelevant to the issue of one's sex-
ual orientation - that is, irrelevant to the. question of the gender of the person one
seeks to have sex with. But, interestingly enough, my resistance to conceptualizing
femininity as part of sexual orientation may well have been related to the fact that
society does not view lesbianism and femininity as compatible. By contrast, a ma-
jority of the public does presume that masculine features and expression are co-
extensive with lesbianism. Hence, a judge or a jury would probably more easily
accept that a lesbian's butchness is part of her sexual orientation. Yet, the reality is
that my femininity is an aspect of my sexual orientation: one of the reasons I like
to "look like a woman" is my intuition that that will make me more attractive to
butch lesbians. I think that would be harder for a judge or jury to understand and
accept.
22 See Feldblum & Minter, supra note 21, at 5.
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expected gender expressions. But there was no consensus that tak-
ing on such cases should become a high priority for gay litigation
groups. Rather, there was a consensus that further conversations
along these lines should be held with women's litigation groups.
The first official effort at engaging the women's litigation
groups occurred in 1998. The Human Rights Campaign and
GenderPAC co-hosted a one-day event in Washington.D.C. and in-
vited representatives of gay rights and women's rights policy and
litigation groups, as well as selected staffers for Members of Con-
gress. (The attendance list and letter of invitation appear as Ap-
pendix D.) The goal of the meeting was simple: to open a
conversation about ways in which the groups could work together
to advance the ultimate goal of ensuring real protection against dis-
crimination based on gender identity or expression. No commit-
ments or significant breakthroughs were made at the meeting. But
the very fact of the conversation was unique and important. More-
over, the meeting energized the staff of GenderPAC (executive di-
rector Riki Wilchins and lawyer Dana Priesing) to continue their
efforts to broaden the debate about gender rights to include both
transgender individuals and gay people.
In June 1998, I stopped working as a consultant for HRC. The
organization had brought on new lawyers, and I felt it was time for
me to apply my energies elsewhere. In particular, I wanted to cre-
ate a legislative lawyering project in a gay rights policy group. My
clinical teaching work over the previous seven years had centered
around the concept that effective advocacy (at either the federal or
state level) requires five types of people: a strategist, a lobbyist, a
legislative lawyer, a grassroots organizer, and a media specialist. 23
In my Federal Legislation Clinic at Georgetown University Law
Center, I had been training students to be legislative lawyers: that
is, lawyers who are equally skilled in and comfortable with law and
politics. I wanted to see if such an effort could be duplicated, on a
full-time basis, in a national gay rights organization.
During summer and fall of 1998, I had the opportunity to help
create this dream. Kerry Lobel, executive director of the National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF), and Rebecca Isaacs,
NGLTF's public policy director, were both excited about having a
23 This is what I call the "Five Circles Theory of Effective Advocacy." See
Feldblum, supra note 9.
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legislative lawyering project at the organization. Funding came
through in January 1999, and the project started in earnest in Au-
gust 1999 with both a state and federal legislative lawyer. I signed
on as a consultant for the project.
For the previous decade, NGLTF had been focused primarily
on state and local legislative initiatives regarding gay rights. But,
for me, a prerequisite for consulting with NGLTF was that the or-
ganization also plan to re-engage with the federal legislative arena.
That included, of course, a commitment to be actively engaged in
the effort to pass ENDA. But ENDA was not a simple issue for
NGLTF. The organization had seen HRC lambasted by the trans-
gender community for not including gender identity in ENDA. In
1996, Lobel had met with representatives of the transgender com-
munity after their disappointing second meeting with HRC.24
Shortly thereafter, the NGLTF board had voted to expand the or-
ganization's mission to read: "the National Gay and Lesbian Task
Force works to eliminate prejudice, violence and injustice against
gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people at the local, state and
national level."'25
Despite the change in NGLTF's mission statement, the organi-
zation did not immediately translate that mission statement into a
concrete policy position on ENDA. It had been relatively easy for
the organization to avoid doing so because NGLTF had not been
largely absent from the federal scene for some years. But that
would need to change were the organization now to engage more
directly with helping to advance ENDA in Congress.
In light of the new role NGLTF was planning to play on the
federal level, Rebecca Isaacs and I held a meeting in March 1999
with a range of transgender legal activists and other interested par-
24 See Frye, supra note 14.
25 The full mission statement reads: "Founded in 1973, the National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force works to eliminate prejudice, violence and injustice against
gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people at the local, state and national level.
As part of a broader social justice movement for freedom, justice and equality,
NGLTF is creating a world that respects and celebrates the diversity of human
expression and identity where all people may fully participate in society." See
www.ngltf.org. Interestingly enough, this change in NGLTF's mission statement
did not come with an accompanying explication as to why fighting discrimination
against transgender people was more consonant with the organization's previous
mission than, for example, fighting discrimination against women in general.
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ties.26 Our question was whether NGLTF should formally ask the
lead Senate sponsors of ENDA to include gender identity when the
bill was reintroduced. I continued to have strategic legal concerns
regarding such a move, and I was looking forward to hearing what
the lawyers in the transgender movement had to say.
All the transgender legal activists were unanimous that ENDA
should be amended to include gender identity. My views were
shaped most significantly by Shannon Minter's arguments. He had
litigated enough cases to be aware of the potential legal down-side
of including such a provision in a bill that might not pass for years.
Nevertheless, he believed that a breakthrough on achieving gender
identity protection under existing sex discrimination laws was not
imminent, and that including gender identity in ENDA would thus
bring essential visibility and energy to transgender issues.
Rebecca and I were both convinced. We pledged that NGLTF
would make an official request to the staffs of Senator Kennedy
and Senator Jeffords for inclusion of gender identity in ENDA.
Having worked on the bill for six years, however, I warned the
group that the staff response to the request was almost certain to be
in the negative. Nevertheless, I felt that "making the ask" was criti-
cal. The request would provide an opening to begin working with
the staff to educate other staffers on Capitol Hill about transgender
issues; and, it would show the staff that NGLTF was serious about
creating some movement on the issue.27
26 Participants in the meeting included Shannon Minter from the National
Center for Lesbian Rights, Liz Seaton from Free State Justice (a Maryland group),
Rebecca Isaacs from the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Dana Priesing
from GenderPAC, Nancy Buermeyer from the Human Rights Campaign, Lisa
Mottet from the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Melinda Whiteway from
the National Lesbian and Gay Law Association (via phone), Jennifer Levi from
Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (via phone), and Beatrice Dohrn from
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund (via phone).
27 1 also asked those attending the meeting whether they believed NGLTF
should still support ENDA, even if (as we expected) the request to add gender
identity was denied. With the exception of one person (who felt she could not
speak for her organization), the answer was affirmative. That approach was con-
sistent with my strategic sense. While I was now willing to try to get gender iden-
tity added to ENDA, I did not think it made any strategic sense to withdraw
support of the bill pending such an addition. I was, therefore, quite surprised when
I found out several months later (through a news media report) that NGLTF had
announced it would not support ENDA without transgender inclusion. Rather
than leave my consultancy with the organization over that disagreement, however,
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As I expected, the staff people for Senator Jeffords and Sena-
tor Kennedy both rejected NGLTF's request that ENDA be
amended to include protection for transgender individuals. But I
was pleasantly surprised at the seriousness of the conversation with
both staff people. Both were quite willing to discuss the existing
lack of guaranteed legal redress for discrimination based on trans-
gender status. Moreover, both felt that as members of the Ameri-
can public started changing their views of transgender individuals
through a concerted educational and visibility effort, Congress
would move as well.
There was little movement on ENDA itself, however, through-
out most of 1999 and 2000. Most of my efforts, therefore, were fo-
cused on helping to increase the effort to use federal sex
discrimination law to remedy discrimination based on gender non-
conformity and gender identity. A historic meeting was held, at
NGLTF's request, at the Department of Justice (DOJ) in early
spring 1999. Lawyers from Department of justice (DOJ), the De-
partment of Education, and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission met with representatives from gay legal and policy
groups28 and from GenderPAC. The goal of the meeting was to
discuss the type of litigation that could be brought by the federal
government under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, to protect
gender non-conforming individuals. The conversation ranged from
high theory to practical suggestions.
Follow-up activities to the DOJ meeting, as well as additional
efforts on the transgender front, were carried out by Lisa Mottet, a
first-year Georgetown Law Center student who volunteered with
NGLTF during spring 1999.29 Lisa worked with Dana Priesing from
GenderPAC to develop a questionnaire that would provide infor-
mation about the type of gender-related discrimination that occurs
in today's workplaces and businesses. (The questionnaire and letter
I told Lobel and Isaacs that I would "agree to disagree" on that issue and that I
would continue to work to pass ENDA in my private capacity as a law professor.
28 The groups included National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Human
Rights Campaign, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, and ACLU Les-
bian & Gay Rights Project. Iattended as a consultant to NGLTF.
29 Lisa Mottet also worked for NGLTF during summer 1999, and then
worked as my research assistant from Sept. 1999 through May 2001. Lisa received
a NAPIL fellowship to run a Transgender Civil Rights project at NGLTF for 2001-
2003.
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appear in Appendix E.) Lisa and I also worked (sporadically, and
only somewhat successfully) with the Department of Education to
help shape their guidance on sexual harassment in the schools. Our
goal was to have the guidance deal more expansively with the range
of gender-based harassment that occurs in the schools, including
harassment based on gender non-conformity. Our official com-
ments on the guidance, which we submitted in December 2000, ap-
pear in Appendix F.
During this same time period, Shannon Minter, Jennifer Levi,
Paisley Currah and other transgender activists were creating docu-
ments, petitions, and briefs to advance the view that discrimination
on the basis of transgender status and expression was both illegal
under existing sex discrimination law and should be explicitly out-
lawed in legislation. The next part of this essay deals with the out-
come of some of those efforts - and what we can learn from them.
WHAT'S NEXT?
The part of the symposium for which I have written this essay
is entitled "Choosing Strategies and Issues for Advancement."
Taking that title seriously, I want to ask two questions. First, is it
time to re-shape our legislative and litigation agendas with regard
to sexual orientation so that our arguments for equality are based
more explicitly on gender equality? Second, is it time for members
of the gay community to rethink their opposition to including trans-
gender status in sexual orientation bills, given that both sexual ori-
entation and transgender status could equally be included under sex
discrimination laws? The second question is directly pointed at
someone like me, as I was eight years ago when I wrote the memo
that appears in Appendix A.
Particularly appropriate, in my mind, is to ask these questions
in the context of the catalyst for this symposium. You are honoring
20 years of Art Leonard's remarkable work in publishing Lesbian/
Gay Law Notes. That publication has been key in ensuring that
those of us who work to advance lesbian and gay equality are kept
updated on recent litigation in the area. And my views on the pos-
sible need to reintegrate a focus on gender in our efforts for gay
equality, and to rethink opposition to including transgender status
in sexual orientation bills, stem directly from some of the recent
cases that have been highlighted in Lesbian/Gay Law Notes.
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A word of qualification first. I do not intend, in this brief es-
say, to systematically review all cases in which plaintiffs have ar-
gued that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of
transgender status or sexual orientation. Such reviews have been
done quite well elsewhere. 30 Nor do I purport to analyze the
strengths and weaknesses of recent cases in which Title VII, and
other sex discrimination laws, have been revitalized in this regard.
Rather, my goal is simply to describe what is occurring. The fact is
that courts are increasingly interpreting sex discrimination laws to
apply to cases of gender non-conformity and transgender status.
Moreover, the reasoning in these cases can equally help gay people
who are discriminated against because of their gender non-con-
formity. My point for this symposium is simply that we should sit
up, take notice of that fact, and figure out how to become part of
the struggle.
Let me first recap a brief history of early cases in this area.
The reasoning in those cases was not particularly complex or so-
phisticated. In fact, the primary reason given for why Title VII31
did not prohibit discrimination against transgender individuals, or
gay men and lesbians, was remarkably simple. Courts simply could
not imagine that a statutory prohibition against discrimination "on
the basis of sex" could encompass an adverse action taken against
an individual because that individual loved someone of the same
sex. It was equally impossible for courts to imagine that this prohi-
bition encompassed adverse action taken against an individual be-
cause that individual identified as a sex different from the one he or
she had been assigned at birth. Why? Because, according to these
courts, Congress never intended to extend non-discrimination pro-
tection to such circumstances, and a court's job is to carry out Con-
gressional intent.32
30 For reviews of transgender jurisprudence, see Kristine W. Holt, Reeavalu-
ating Holloway: Title VII, Equal Protection, and the Evolution of a Transgender
Jurisprudence, 70 TEMPLE L. REV. 283, 306 (1997); Julie Greenberg, Defining Male
and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIz. L.
REV. 265 (1999); Richard F. Storrow, Naming the Grotesque Body in the "Nascent
Jurisprudence of Transsexualism," 4 MIcHi. J. GENDER & L. 275 (1997). See Jon W.
Davidson, Gender Neutral, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 3, 2001.
31 Almost all the cases using sex discrimination law took place in the context
of employment.
32 The primary Congressional intent identified by the courts was to provide
economic opportunity to women. See, e.g. Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.
2d 325, 327 (5thCir. 1978) ("Congress by its proscription of sex discrimination in-
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There were some dissenting voices, even in those early years.
For example, neither Judge Goodwin in 1977 on the Fifth Circuit,33
nor Judge Grady in 1983 in federal district court,34 believed that
when Congress passed Title VII, it did so to protect transsexuals.
But both judges were more concerned with what the statute actu-
ally meant, than with what Congress intended it to mean.35 From
Judge Goodwin's perspective, a person who changed his or her sex
(or was in the process of doing so) was clearly encompassed in a
statute that prohibited discrimination "because of sex."' 36 From
Judge Grady's perspective, the trial he presided over provided him
tended only to guarantee equal job opportunities for males and females."); Hollo-
way v. Arthur Anderson Co., 566 F. 2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) (explaining that
Congress intended to "remedy the economic deprivation of women as a class").
Providing protection to gay people or transgender people did not fall within this
purpose. Various courts also stressed the fact that there was no positive indication
in the legislative history that Congress wished to cover gay people or transgender
people. See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F. 2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)
("Had Congress intended more, surely the legislative history would have at least
mentioned its intended broad coverage of homosexuals, transvestites, or transsexu-
als..."). Moreover, courts relied on the fact that Congress had consistently failed
to pass legislation that would add protection for gay people to federal civil rights
law. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur Anderson Co., 566 F. 2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977)
(noting the failure of several bills to pass which would prohibit discrimination
based on "sexual preference"). Courts interpreted the failure of such bills as evi-
dence that "sex" was to be given a narrow, traditional definition with regard to
both gay people and transgender people.
33 See Holloway, 566 F. 2d 659, 664 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
34 Judge Grady ruled in favor of Karen Ulane at the district court level. See
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821 (N.D.lII. 1983), rev'd by Ulane v.
Eastern Airlines, 742 F. 2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
35 See Holloway, 566 F. 2d at 664 (Goodwin, J., dissenting) ("While I agree
with the majority in the belief that Congress probably never contemplated that
Title VII would apply to transsexuals, I dissent from the decision that the statute
affords such plaintiffs no benefit ..... .The only issue before us is whether a
transsexual whose condition has not yet become stationary can state a claim under
the statute if discharged because of her undertaking to change her sex. I read from
the language of the statute itself that she can.") (emphasis added); Ulane, 581 F.
Supp. at 822 ("The legislative history of the statute I have just quoted is hardly a
gold mine of information .... [T]hose who have looked a little further into this
matter know that this amendment introducing sex into the picture was a gambit of
a Southern senator who sought thereby to scuttle the whole Civil Rights Act, and
much to his amazement and no doubt undying disappointment, it did not work.
We not only got an act including race discrimination, which he had sought to bar,
but we got sex as well. The question we are confronting here today is: What did we
get when we got sex?") (emphasis added).
36 See Holloway, 566 F. 2d at 664 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
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with a fascinating experience in learning that the word "sex" did
not necessarily have a self-evident meaning.37 Based on the evi-
dence in the trial, he concluded that "sex is not a cut-and-dried mat-
ter of chromosomes," and that "'sex,' as used in any scientific sense
and as used in the statute can be and should be reasonably inter-
preted to include among its denotations the questions of sexual
identity. "38
Let's fast forward approximately twenty years. Two Supreme
Court cases are creating a new momentum in sex discrimination
law. One case is over ten years old; the other is of more recent
vintage. Together, they are changing the approach of courts to sex
discrimination and gender non-conformity.
The first case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, dealt largely with
a procedural question under Title VII regarding the manner in
which a case should be handled when inappropriate reliance on
gender is one factor in an employer's decision-making.39 Indeed,
law professors often still teach Price Waterhouse, solely for this
principle. But Justice Brennan's opinion also addressed whether
gender played "a motivating part in [the] employment decision" in
the case before the Court. 40 The respondent, Ann Hopkins,
claimed she was denied a promotion because she did not act in a
sufficiently feminine manner.4' Her claim was not that her em-
ployer routinely denied promotions to all women. Rather, her
claim was that her employer denied her a promotion because she
was not the right type of woman - that is, she was a woman who
did not sufficiently conform to her employer's expectations of how
a "real woman" should act or look.
Justice Brennan's opinion noted that "[i]n the specific context
of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief
that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has
37 Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 824. ("Prior to my participation in this case, I would
have had no doubt that the question of sex was a very straightforward matter of
whether you are male or female. That there could be any doubt about the matter
had simply never occurred to me... [a]fter listening to the evidence in this case, it
is clear to me there is no settled definition in the medical community as to what we
mean by sex.") (quoting Grady, J.).
38 Id. at 825.
39 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
40 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 248.
41 Hopkins' supervisor told her to "walk more femininely, talk more femi-
ninely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jew-
elry." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234-235.
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acted on the basis of gender. ' 42 Moreover, Justice Brennan noted
that the "parties do not overtly dispute [this] proposition." Never-
theless, lawyers for Price Waterhouse put the term "sex stereotyp-
ing" in quotation marks throughout their brief to the Court. This
provoked a somewhat stinging rebuke from the Court:
[T]he placement by Price Waterhouse of "sex stere-
otyping" in quotation marks throughout its brief seems
to us an insinuation either that such stereotyping was
not present in this case or that it lacks legal relevance.
We reject both possibilities. As to the existence of sex
stereotyping in this case, we are not inclined to quarrel
with the District Court's conclusion .... As for the
legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the
day when an employer could evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they match the stereotype as-
sociated with their group...43
The Court's opinion in Price Waterhouse manifested a broader
view of what "because of sex" can mean than had been apparent in
previous cases. But there is still a distance between acknowledging
that an employer violates Title VII when he refuses to promote a
woman because she is not "feminine enough," and recognizing that
an employer similarly violates Title VII when he refuses to promote
a woman because she looks like a man - or perhaps, because she
lived as a man for a period of time. It is not that this is a particu-
larly significant leap in logic. But the leap does represent a more
significant distance from what a court might reasonably conclude
Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII.44
42 Id. at 248.
43 Id. at 250-251.
44 Even Justice Brennan sought to tie his result in Price Waterhouse to Con-
gress' intent. Justice Brennan did not dispute that a principal goal of adding sex to
Title VII was to provide women with better economic opportunity. Rather, he
simply expanded the view of what might preclude women from achieving such
opportunity: for example, employers' use of sex stereotypes often precluded
women from certain jobs. Id. at 251 ("An employer who objects to aggressiveness
in women but whose position require this trait places women in an intolerable and
impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if
they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.") This is consistent with Justice
Brennan's general approach to statutory interpretation, in which he viewed it as
critical to determine a purpose of the enacting Congress that was consistent with
his interpretation of the words Congress used. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of
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The Supreme Court's opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner, pro-
vides the second step necessary to complete the analysis. In that
case, Justice Scalia pointedly noted that even if the words of Title
VII compel a result Congress has not expressly contemplated, "it is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal con-
cerns of our legislators by which we are governed. ' 45 Oncale dealt
with a male employee who alleged sexual harassment by his male
supervisors and co-workers. The Court had already held that Title
VII's prohibition of discrimination "because of . . . sex" protects
men as well as women,46 and in Oncale, the Court clarified that
nothing in Title VII barred a claim merely because the plaintiff and
defendant were of the same sex.47
Justice Scalia pointed out that lower courts had easily applied
that principle where an employee claimed to have been passed over
for promotion. However, in the context of "hostile environment"
sexual harassment claims, Justice Scalia observed, "the state and
federal courts have taken a bewildering variety of stances."48 Some
of those bewildering results could be explained by the various
courts' desire to reflect original Congressional intent. Justice
Scalia, however, was not bothered by that small point. As he
explained:
America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) [hereinafter Weber]. For
a contrasting, albeit not entirely opposing approach to statutory interpretation, see
Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Weber. Justice Blackmun was willing to con-
cede that the enacting Congress may have had one purpose in mind, but in the
interest of creating a coherent body of interpretation, he believed the legislature
was willing to have the courts modify that purpose. See Weber, 443 U.S. 193 at 209
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
45 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998). I do
not quote this sentence lightly. It was penned by Justice Scalia, author of the On-
cale opinion, and is clearly intended as an endorsement of a strict textualist ap-
proach to statutory interpretation, rather than a "legal process" approach to such
interpretation. See, e.g. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey eds., 1994). My personal approach to statutory in-
terpretation hews more closely to a legal process approach. Nonetheless, one need
not read too much into this sentence. Oncale was a unanimous decision, and hence
all nine Justices clearly felt the language used in the opinion could be read as con-
sistent with the particular approach to statutory interpretation held by each Jus-
tice. See infra for further comments on statutory interpretation.
46 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669
(1983).
47 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
48 Id.
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As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual
harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the
principal evil Congress was concerned with when it en-
acted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often go be-
yond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable
evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws
rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by
which we are governed. Title VII prohibits "discrimi-
nation because of . . .sex" in the "terms" or "condi-
tions" of employment. Our holding that this includes
sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of
any kind that meets the statutory requirements. 49
The question then becomes, of course, what type of action
meets the statutory requirement that it be taken on the basis of
"sex?" Here is where Price Waterhouse and Oncale converge.
Courts are increasingly acknowledging that adverse action taken
against an individual because that individual does not conform to
societal expectations of how a "real man" or "real woman" should
look or act are actions taken "because of sex." And such an under-
standing is no longer precluded simply because Congress had not
contemplated such a result when it enacted Title VII in 1964.
For example, in Schwenk v. Hartford, a transgender person was
sexually harassed and assaulted by a prison guard and brought suit
under the Gender Motivated Violence Act (GMVA).5 0 The de-
fense argued that the GMVA was parallel to Title VII, and just as
Title VII did not protect transgender people (as the Ninth Circuit
had held in Holloway in 1977), neither did the GMVA.
The defense won part of the argument, but not quite as antici-
pated. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the GMVA and Title VII
should be understood and interpreted in concert. But, according to
the Ninth Circuit, "the initial judicial approach taken in cases such
as Holloway has been overruled by the logic and language of Price
Waterhouse. ' 51 That is, under Price Waterhouse, Title VII bars dis-
crimination based on the fact that a woman "fail[s] 'to act like a
woman' - that is, to conform to socially-constructed gender expec-
tations. ' 52 What matters, as the court explained, "is that in the
49 Id. at 79-80.
50 Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F. 3d 1187, 1193-94 (9thCir. 2000).
51 Id. at 1201.
52 Id. at 1201-02.
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mind of the perpetrator the discrimination is related to the sex of
the victim: here, for example, the perpetrator's actions stem from
the fact that he believed that the victim was a man who 'failed to act
like' one."153 "The GMVA does parallel Title VII," the panel ex-
plained, but "discrimination because one fails to act in the way ex-
pected of a man or a woman is forbidden under Title VII. '54
Schwenk is not an isolated occurrence. Courts and human
rights commissions are beginning to understand the intuitive point
that "because of sex" includes "because of expectations about sex."
For example, in Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., the plaintiff, a
biological man who dresses and lives as a woman, requested a loan
application from a bank employee. As Jennifer Levi, Rosa's law-
yer, describes the incident that occurred: "Rosa gave the loan of-
ficer three pieces of identification containing her photograph. In
one photograph Rosa appeared traditionally masculine, in one she
appeared traditionally feminine, and in one she appeared gender
ambiguous. The loan office responded with disgust and would not
help her until she 'went home and changed' to look more like the
identification card in which she appeared traditionally masculine. '55
Rosa brought suit under the federal Equal Credit Opportunity
Act and a state public accommodations law, both prohibiting dis-
crimination based on sex. The district court granted the bank's mo-
tion to dismiss, in a cursory page and a half opinion, with the bare
conclusion that "the issue in this case is not [Rosa's] sex, but rather
how he chose to dress when applying for a loan."'56 The First Cir-
cuit reversed the motion to dismiss, concluding it could not say
"that the plaintiff has no viable theory of sex discrimination consis-
tent with the facts alleged." For example, the court observed, it is
reasonable to infer that the loan officer told Rosa to go home and
change clothes "because she thought that Rosa's attire did not ac-
cord with his male gender: in other words, that Rosa did not receive
the loan application because he was a man, whereas a similarly situ-
53 Id. at 1202.
54 Id.
55 See Jennifer Levi, Paving the Road: A Charles Hamilton Houston Ap-
proach to Securing Trans Rights, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 5, 33 (2000).'
56 Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., Civ. Action No. 99-30085-FHF, slip
op. at 1 (D. Mass. Oct. 16, 1998), rev'd 214 F. 3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000). The district
court and the First Circuit referred to Rosa with the masculine pronoun. I prefer
to use the pronoun preferred by the individual, which is feminine. See Levi, supra
note 56.
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ated woman would have received the loan application." If so, the
court concluded, that would state a claim for discrimination on the
basis of sex.57
In Doe v. Yunits, a fifteen year old student, Pat Doe, sought an
injunction to prohibit her school from requiring that she not dress
in girls' clothes or accessories.58 Doe was born biologically male,
but has a female gender identity. A Massachusetts Superior Court
granted the injunction, finding that Doe had a likelihood of suc-
ceeding on the merits of her claim that her right to attend school
free of sex discrimination had been violated.59 The school argued
that its rule was gender neutral, because it would equally discipline
a female student for wearing distracting items of men's clothing,
such as a fake beard. But the court's response was that the school
had not framed the issue correctly. As the court explained: "Since
plaintiff identifies with the female gender, the right question is
whether a female student would be disciplined for wearing items of
clothes plaintiff chooses to wear. If the answer to that question is
no, plaintiff is being discriminated against on the basis of her sex,
which is biologically male." '60
And finally, in November 2000, the Connecticut Commission
on Human Rights and Opportunities issued a declaratory ruling
that discrimination against an individual based on transgender sta-
tus constituted discrimination based on sex under Connecticut
law.61 The Commission had received a petition on behalf of John/
Jane Doe requesting such a declaratory ruling, and several groups
57 Rosa, 214 F. 3d at 214.
58 Doe v. Yunits et. al., No. 00-1060-A, slip op. (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11,
2000), affd sub nom, Doe v. Brockton Sch. Comm. No. 2000-J-638, slip op. (Mass.
App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000). Jennifer Levi served as Doe's attorney.
59 Id., slip op. at 10-12. The court also concluded that Doe was likely to
succeed on her claim that her freedom of expression under the Massachusetts con-
stitution had been unconstitutionally abridged. Id. at 5-9.
60 Id. at 11. Doe had specifically been prohibited from wearing padded bras,
skirts or dresses, or wigs. Id. at 3. The court also pointed out that cases which
failed to cover discrimination against transsexuals under sex discrimination law
"have been criticized and distinguished under both Title VII and the First and
Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 11-12.
61 See Declaratory Ruling on Behalf of John/Jane Doe (Conn. Comm'n
Human Rights & Opportunities Nov. 9, 2000), available at http://www.state.ct.us/
chro/metapages/HearingOffice/HODecisions/declaratoryrulings/DRDoe.htm
[hereinafter CT Declaratory Ruling].
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
intervened to support the petition.62 The Commission adopted a
definition of transgender people, which includes transsexuals (both
pre-and post-operative), intersexed people, anyone whose self-de-
scribed gender identity is other than their sexual identity at birth
(regardless of whether such individuals have had hormonal treat-
ment or surgery), and also apparently effeminate men and mascu-
line women. 63 With regard to all such individuals, the reasoning of
the Connecticut Commission was straightforward. As the Commis-
sion noted, quite succinctly, "more and more courts have ruled that
having specific expectations that a person will manifest certain be-
havior based upon his or her gender is not only conceptually out-
moded sexual stereotyping, but also an unlawful form of sex
discrimination." 64
The renewed focus by courts on using Price Waterhouse to pro-
hibit discrimination based on gender stereotypes is something that
gay men and lesbians should take note of as well. Indeed, in two
recent cases, gay plaintiffs tried to make the argument on appeal
that they had suffered harassment because of gender stereotyping.
Both lost - but not because the courts felt their arguments lacked
legal viability under Title VII. Rather, the plaintiffs lost because
they had not made their argument at the trial level, and had not
backed it up with sufficient evidence.
Analyzing these two cases - Higgins v. New Balance65 and
Simonton v. Runyon 66 - in light of the brief historical overview
presented in this essay, is fascinating. One of the earliest cases in
which a gay man sought protection under Title VII was Smith v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.67 In that case, Bennie Smith
62 The following organizations intervened, with a document principally au-
thored by Jennifer Levi: Connecticut Coalition for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender Civil Rights; Connecticut Women's Education and Legal Fund; Gay
& Lesbian Advocates & Defenders; Human Rights Campaign; National Center for
Lesbian Rights; Female-to-Male International and GenderPAC. Levi also made
an appearance before the Commission. The Connecticut Civil Liberties Union
Foundation intervened, with a separate document.
63 See CT Declaratory Ruling, supra note 62 at 23-27.
64 See CT Declaratory Ruling, supra note 62 at 10. For additional cases
along these lines, see Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc., 626 N.Y.S. 2d 391 (Sup. Ct.
1995) (interpreting sex in New York's anti-discrimination law to include transsexu-
als); Rentos v. OCE-Office Sys., No. 95 Civ. 7908LAP, 1996 WL 737215 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 24, 1996).
65 Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F. 3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999).
66 Simonton v. Runyon, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 21139, *11 (2nd Cir. 2000).
67 Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F. 2d 325 (5thCir. 1978).
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applied for employment in Liberty Mutual's mailroom, and was de-
nied the job because the supervisor felt Smith was "effeminate."
The defendant conceded that Smith had been rejected because the
interviewer "considered Smith effeminate." Smith did not, how-
ever, apparently argue that Title VII prohibits employers from re-
quiring men to act in a "masculine" fashion, but rather that the law
"forbids an employer to reject a job applicant based on his or her
affectional or sexual preference. '68 That argument went down to
swift defeat, with the Fifth Circuit upholding the district court's
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 69
The district court's analysis is particularly illuminating, how-
ever, because it captures how inconceivable it seemed to some
judges that gender stereotyping could be a violation of Title VII.
As the court explained:
Plaintiff points out that defendant employed a female
black applicant for the position sought by plaintiff. He
thus argues that the defendant accepted an employee
presumably displaying effeminate characteristics, re-
sulting in plaintiff's having been discriminated against
because he was male. The Court views the situation
differently. It appears that the defendant concluded
that the plaintiff, a male, displayed characteristics inap-
propriate to his sex, the counterpart being a female ap-
plicant displaying inappropriate masculine attributes. 70
In Higgins and Simonton, the reaction of the appellate courts
to the argument that the plaintiffs had suffered harassment because
of gender stereotyping was light years away from the response Ben-
nie Smith received from federal district court. The First Circuit
noted that the combination of Price Waterhouse and Oncale made
clear that "just as a woman can ground an action on a claim that
men discriminated against her because she did not meet stereo-
typed expectations of femininity, . . . a man can ground a claim on
68 Id. at 325.
69 As usual, the appellate court's reasoning was that "Congress by its pro-
scription of sex discrimination intended only to guarantee equal job opportunities
for males and females," and the prohibition on sexual discrimination could not be
"extended to situations of questionable application without stronger Congressional
mandate." Id. at 326-27.
70 Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098, 1099 n.2, affd by
Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F. 2d 325 (5thCir. 1978).
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evidence that other men discriminated against him because he did
not meet stereotypes expectations of masculinity."7 ' And the Sec-
ond Circuit concluded that a plaintiff could legitimately argue that
harassment based on "failure to conform to gender norms, regard-
less of [the plaintiff's] sexual orientation," states a claim under Title
VII. As the court explained: "This would not bootstrap protection
for sexual orientation into Title VII because not all homosexual
men are stereotypically feminine, and not all heterosexual men are
stereotypically masculine. But it would plainly afford relief for dis-
crimination based on sexual stereotype." 72
In both Higgins and Simonton, the plaintiffs were not arguing
that all gay people are covered under Title VII, but rather only
those that experienced discrimination based on their gender non-
conformity. Indeed, covering all gay people under Title VII might
be, as the 2nd Circuit explained, inappropriately "bootstrap[ping]
protection for sexual orientation" into Title VII.
But the Second Circuit's concern with bootstrapping sexual
orientation protection into Title VII is not relevant if one is com-
fortable with a strict textualist approach to Title VII, as manifested
in Oncale, or if one is able to divine a more general purpose to sex
discrimination law beyond that of advancing economic opportunity
for women. Discrimination based on gender stereotyping does not
exhaust the meaning of discrimination "because of sex." As a tex-
tual matter, it should be relatively easy to ground protection for all
gay people (not just gender non-conforming gay people) in sex dis-
crimination laws. That is, if a woman who is attracted to and en-
gages in sexual activity with a man is permitted to remain on a job,
but a woman who is attracted to and engages in sexual activity with
a woman is fired from a job, what is that other than discrimination
because of sex? Of course, covering gay people is not what the
Congress that enacted Title VII specifically had in mind in 1964.
But how is the act of discrimination not, from a simple textual mat-
ter, discrimination "because of sex"? 73
71 Higgins, 194 F. 2d at 261.
72 Simonton v. Runyon, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 21139, at *13 (2nd Cir. 2000).
Not all recent cases, however, have been equally open to this argument. See Ham-
mer v. St. Vincent Hospital and Health Care Center, 224 F. 3d 701, 704 (7th Cir.
2000) (relying on Ulane to construe sex to cover biological males and females
only).
73 Robert Wintemute makes this point in a very neat and elegant manner in
his piece, Recognising New Kinds of Direct Sex Discrimination: Transsexualism,
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Although most lawyers have not vigorously pursued sex dis-
crimination claims for their gay clients, ever since such claims were
brusquely rejected by courts in the 1970s (based on congressional
intent),74 the argument has been enjoying a bit of a recent renais-
sance. For example, both the Hawaii Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals of Oregon have used sex discrimination law to ground
their analyses of, respectively, the reservation of marriage for oppo-
site-sex couples, and the denial of benefits to same-sex domestic
partners. 75
Sexual Orientation and Dress Codes, 60 MOD. L. REV. 334, 344-352 (1997). As
Wintemute explains, "[t]o analyse a case of discrimination against a gay, lesbian, or
bisexual individual.., as based on the sex of the individual... the comparison and
comparator must be changed. Instead of comparing the treatment of sexual orien-
tations ... one compares the treatment of persons of both sexes who are attracted
to (or engage in sexual activity with) persons of a given sex .... Thus, a gay or
bisexual man dismissed from the armed forces compares himself with a heterosex-
ual woman who is also attracted to men and is permitted to serve, and a lesbian or
bisexual woman compares herself with a heterosexual man who is also attracted to
women and is permitted to serve. In each case, 'but for' the sex of the individual,
they would have been treated differently. Being attracted to men is acceptable in a
woman but not in a man, and being attracted to women is acceptable in a man but
not a woman." Id. at 345. Wintemute also points out how the analysis in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), similarly explains how a prohibition of different-race
marriages (which applied equally to both races) was still race discrimination. Id. at
345, n. 45.
74 See generally, supra note 5.
75 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P. 2d 44, 60 (Haw. 1993) ("Rudimentary princi-
ples of statutory construction render manifest the fact that, by its plain language,
HRS § 572-i (Hawaii's marriage statute) restricts the marital relation to a male
and a female .... Accordingly, on its face and (as Lewin admits) as applied, HRS
§ 572-1 denies same-sex couples access to the marital status and its concomitant
rights and benefits. It is the state's regulation of access to the status of married
persons, on the basis of the applicants' sex, that gives rise to the question whether
the applicant couples have been denied the equal protection of the laws . . .")
(emphasis added); Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University, 971 P. 2d 435, 442
(Or. App. 1998) ("The statute prohibits discrimination on the basis of the 'sex ...
of any other person with whom an individual associates.' Plaintiffs allege that [the
defendant] discriminated against them by denying them the option of providing
their domestic partners insurance benefits because their domestic partners are of
the same sex. Discrimination of that sort hinges on the sex of the individual with
whom plaintiffs associate. It plainly falls within the wording of the statute."). Title
VII has been interpreted to prohibit discrimination based on the race of the person
with whom an employee or applicant associates. See also Ray v. Antioch School
Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (court rules it is reasonable to
infer that a student targeted for harassment "due to his perceived sexual status as a
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A more simple, textual analysis can also apply to transsexuals
who choose to change their sex. As other commentators have ob-
served, if an employer fires an individual because she converts from
Christianity to Judaism, one presumes that would be considered dis-
crimination "because of religion. '76 That is, discrimination because
of a "change in religion" is logically subsumed under the term "be-
cause of religion." Thus, an employer should not allowed to escape
liability by arguing he has no problem with hiring people who are
either Christian or Jewish, but simply he has a moral problem with
hiring people who have converted from one religion to another.
Similarly, if discrimination occurs because someone has announced
a change of his or her sex from the one assigned at birth (either
through surgery, hormones, or simply by a statement of identity),
that should constitute discrimination because of sex.
If these textualist approaches were adopted, the remaining in-
dividuals who would then benefit from a gender stereotyping analy-
sis under Title VII would be those individuals, gay or straight, who
identify with the sex assigned to them at birth, but who manifest
characteristics normally associated with the opposite sex, or those
individuals who resist identification with any particular gender.
Such individuals contest gender lines and gender stereotypes.
Hence, if such individuals experience discrimination on such bases,
that discrimination should appropriately be viewed as "because of
sex" based on sexual stereotypes.
So, where does this new line of cases leave us with regard to
the questions I posed in the beginning of this part of the essay?
Should gay litigators ground their claims more vigorously on sex
discrimination laws? Should gay political groups seeking enactment
of ENDA argue that gay people are already covered under sex dis-
crimination laws, but that a law such as ENDA is still important to
homosexual" was being attacked because of a "perceived belief about Plaintiff's
sexuality, i.e., that Plaintiff was harassed on the basis of sex.").
76 See Kristine W. Holt, Reeavaluating Holloway: Title VII, Equal Protection,
and the Evolution of a Transgender Jurisprudence, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 283, 306
(1997); Richard F. Storrow, Naming the Grotesque Body in the "Nascent Jurispru-
dence of Transsexualism," 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 334 (1997); Jennifer Levi
& Maureen M. Murphy, Public Policy Analysis and Position Statement of the Pro-
posed Intervenors for Declaratory Ruling on Behalf of John/Jane Doe (March 8,
2000); see Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Strug-
gle to Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality for Transgender People, 7 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 41-50 (2000).
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ensure that courts consistently apply such protection? And what
does all of this mean with regard to the political controversy that
involved me in this issue in the first place: the exclusion of trans-
gender status from ENDA?
I do not purport to have definitive answers to these questions.
But I do have some thoughts that have been triggered by my review
of this recent line of caselaw.
First, there is no doubt in my mind that the positive judicial
opinions we have begun to see regarding transgender people (and I
use the term here in its broadest sense, to include transsexuals, in-
tersexed people, and effeminate men and masculine women) 77 have
been possible solely because of attitudinal changes in society. This
is a basic, common-sense observation that has been true of every
stigmatized, minority group. As members of the general public be-
gin to better know people who are (fill in the blank) Jewish, Afri-
can-American, gay, or transgender, their view of such individuals as
less than human or as immoral begins to waver. Sometimes, the
public begins to know such individuals solely through a television
show, a movie, or a news article.78 But ultimately, personal contact
with a member of a stigmatized group is the best mechanism for
changing people's hearts and minds about the group. Thus, I
strongly believe that anyone who cares about gender equality must
support enhanced visibility of transgender people and increased ed-
ucation about the lives and realities of such individuals.
Second, I believe those who litigate on behalf of gay rights,
women's rights, and/or transgender rights have an obligation to
work together to enhance the judicial outcomes for all groups under
sex discrimination laws. Such an effort certainly has begun,79 but it
77 See generally Currah & Minter supra note 79; Levi, supra note 56, at
17-18.
78 For example, I think it is hard to underestimate the effect the movie Boys
Don't Cry has had on increasing the public's understanding of transgender people.
See also Deb Price, Transgendered Have Lessons for Society, DETROIT NEWS, June
26, 2000, at 9; Eric Bailey, Teacher Quits in Settlement of SexChange Furor, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1999, at A3.
79 For example, the GayLegal Roundtable has discussed gender non-con-
formity issues at several sessions following the one that Shannon and I requested,
and various gay and women's groups have signed onto amicus briefs dealing with
transgender issues. For example, in Hernandez-Montiel, NCLR, Lambda, and the
ACLU of Southern California jointly submitted an amicus brief arguing that being
feminine was an intrinsic part of gay identity for some gay men. In a well-crafted
opinion, the Ninth Circuit agreed. See Hernandez-Montiel v. Immigration and
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seems to me these efforts can and should be redoubled. For exam-
ple, the national gay rights groups should bring some cases in which
claims for relief are grounded in sex discrimination law. Presuma-
bly, such claims will more likely prevail on behalf of gay clients who
are gender non-conforming. But, as a true believer in incremental-
ism,80 I see no harm in using a strategy that will initially benefit only
a sub-group of gay people. Moreover, if courts begin to accept ei-
ther a strict textualist approach to sex discrimination law, or a
broad legal process approach, there is no reason why all gay people
could not ultimately be protected under sex discrimination law.
But to achieve such results, those who litigate on behalf of gay
rights, women's rights, and/or transgender rights must work
together.81
Naturalization Serv., 225 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Gay men with female
sexual identities outwardly manifest their identities through characteristics tradi-
tionally associated with women, such as feminine dress, long hair and fingernails
.... Their female sexual identities unite this group of gay men, and their sexual
identities are so fundamental to their human identities that they should not be
required to change them."). See also intervenor groups on the Connecticut peti-
tion, supra note 63.
80 I have also sometimes described this quality of mine as being a "pragma-
tist with a passion."
81 1 also believe it is useful to have a group, such as GenderPAC, which does
not identify with any one constituency (e.g., women, men, gay men, lesbians, bisex-
uals, or transgender people), but instead advocates for gender equality across the
board for all such constituencies. Such a group, however, cannot substitute for a
national group devoted primarily to the rights of transgender people. Such litiga-
tion and political groups currently exist for women, see, e.g., National Organiza-
tion for Women Legal Defense and Education Fund, National Organization for
Women, National Women's Law Center, and National Partnership for Women and
Families. Such groups also exist for gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals, see, e.g.,
Human Rights Campaign, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, ACLU
Lesbian and Gay Rights Project. (While neither the ACLU project nor LAMBDA
include transgender people in their mission, in practice both organizations have
brought litigation on behalf of transgender and gender non-conforming plaintiffs.)
Finally, there are also groups who have gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, and trans-
gender people as their explicit constituencies. See, e.g., National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Parents and Friends of Lesbi-
ans and Gays, and National Center for Lesbian Rights (lesbians and transgender
people). (Several months after I delivered this speech, but prior to publication of
this essay, the Human Rights Campaign added "gender expression and identity" to
its mission statement.) I am enough of a believer in the usefulness of identity
politics, however, that I believe a vibrant, national transgender group would be a
useful addition to the scene.
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Third, the argument that protection for discrimination based
on transgender status should not be added to local, state, or na-
tional laws because such protection already exists under sex dis-
crimination laws (properly construed) needs to be rethought.
Based on the existing case law, the same argument could be made
with regard to protection for discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
Obviously, when Bella Abzug introduced the first federal gay
rights bill in 1974,82 it did not seem likely that courts would inter-
pret sex discrimination law to prohibit discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation. Thus, the only avenue at the time appeared to be
enactment of a new law. But even in 2001, when there is a renewed
possibility that sex discrimination laws could cover many, or even
all, gay people, local, state, and national gay rights groups still be-
lieve new laws should be enacted to explicitly prohibit discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation. Why? The reality is that it could
well take a long time for all courts, and ultimately the Supreme
Court, to adopt the interpretation of "because of sex" described in
this essay. Thus, it makes sense, as a strategic matter, to adopt a
two-track approach: argue in the courts for an interpretation of sex
discrimination law that protects gay people, and at the same time,
seek enactment of legislation explicitly prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation. Obviously, the second track will be
used by some, if not many, courts to undermine the judicial claims
made in the first track.83 But those courts that wish to adopt a tex-
tualist reading, or a broader purposive reading, of sex discrimina-
tion law will not be hampered by the fact that Congress may have
decided to protect a group in two separate laws. 84
There are also educational and visibility advantages in seeking
legislation that explicitly prohibits discrimination based on sexual
82 See Feldblum, supra note 7.
83 See, e.g., Simonton, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 21139, at *6; Holloway v. Ar-
thur Anderson Co., 566 F. 2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting the failure of several
bills to pass which would prohibit discrimination based on "sexual preference").
84 For example, people with disabilities who work for employers that receive
federal funds and have more than fifteen employees are protected under both Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. See
Currah & Minter, supra note 79, at 44-65. I do believe, given the recent trend in
the case law, that supporters of ENDA should clarify that existing sex discrimina-
tion law (properly construed) already protects gay people, but that ENDA is still
necessary to ensure such protection is uniformly and immediately applied.
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orientation. Tom Stoddard, in the last piece he wrote before his
untimely passing, eloquently describes the ways in which public de-
bate on legislation helps change attitudes in ways that can ulti-
mately affect societal views in more meaningful ways. 85 The
hearings, the lobbying, and the debate on ENDA are useful not
only as a means to an end; they are useful as an end in themselves.
These same considerations should apply when one considers
whether transgender status should be added to a sexual orientation
bill, a sex discrimination law, or a separate bill entirely.8 6 That is,
the same reasons for adopting a two-track approach for gaining
protection based on sexual orientation should apply with regard to
obtaining protection for transgender status. Obviously, adding
transgender status to a national bill such as ENDA carries the pos-
sibility that courts will use such an addition to undermine the claim
that sex discrimination law prohibits discrimination based on trans-
gender status. But that is not substantially different than the situa-
tion that currently obtains for gay people. Certainly, transgender
people should be allowed to take the same calculated risk, if they so
desire.87 Moreover, the advantages of pushing for explicit legisla-
tion remain as well: the visibility and educational components, and
85 See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to
Make Social Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967 (1997). See also Nan D. Hunter,
Response: Lawyering for Social Justice., 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1009 (1997); Chai R.
Feldblum, Response: The Moral Rhetoric of Legislation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 992
(1997).
86 See generally, Currah & Minter, supra note 79. (describing pros and cons
of various approaches); see generally PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, Pol-
icy Institute of the Nat'l Gay and Lesbian Task Force & National Center for Les-
bian Rights, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK FOR AcTIVISTs AND
POLICYMAKERS (2000), available at http://www.ngltf.org/library/index.cfm, for ex-
cellent survey of protection for transgender individuals.
87 See, e.g., Jennifer Levi, Letter to the Editor, WASHINGTON BLADE, Jan. 19,
2001 (calling for a two-track approach of litigation and legislation). Obviously, the
legal landscape for transgender people in 2001 is different (as this essay makes
clear) than the comparable legal landscape was for gay people in 1974. Neverthe-
less, even had the legal landscape been comparable, I doubt gay rights groups
would have foregone the introduction of a gay rights bill. However, given the
greater exposure a national bill can garner, and in light of the fact that it may be
useful to provide courts a window in which to accept a broader view of sex discrim-
ination without the complication of a non-moving federal bill, it might make more
sense to focus on enacting transgender inclusive legislation on the state and local
level.
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the immediate guarantee of real protection once the law is
enacted.88
Finally, I would like to add a few comments regarding statutory
interpretation. A strict textualist approach to statutory interpreta-
tion, advocated most effectively by Justice Scalia over the last de-
cades, has resulted - I believe - in a salutory effect on Capitol
Hill. I notice that Members of Congress and their staffs are more
attuned to the need to carefully choose and understand the words
of a bill (and not depend as heavily on legislative history), and I
teach my students, in the Federal Legislation Clinic, to do the same.
I personally, however, continue to be a strong advocate of the
legal process school of statutory interpretation.89 That is, I believe
the words of a statute are the most important beginning and ending
places of interpretation. 90 I also believe, however, that words will
not necessarily always have one, obvious meaning that can naturally
be discerned by a court.91 In some rare cases, it will be impossible
88 See generally, Currah & Minter, supra note 79; see also Levi, Letter to the
Editor, supra note 90.
89 See HART & SACKS, supra note 46. My view of a legal process mode of
interpretation is quite broad and would probably encompass what William Es-
kridge terms "dynamic statutory interpretation." See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dy-
namic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). Thus, for example,
I agreed with the approach of Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Weber, and with
the results in Yellow Cab and Shine - examples of what Eskridge terms "dynamic
statutory interpretation." See Weber, 443 U.S. 193 at 209 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring); Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Calif., 532 P. 2d 1226 (Calif. 1975); Shine v. Shine,
802 F. 2d 583 (1st Cir. 1986). I believe, however, that it is possible to understand
these results as carrying out the legitimate "meta-intent" of the enacting
legislature.
90 See Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Dis-
crimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21
BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 91 (2000) (acknowledging that the words I helped
craft for the Americans with Disabilities Act for the definition of "disability" did
not effectively coincide with the group of individuals we were intending to
protect).
91 94 For example, in one of Justice Scalia's most famous cases, MCI Tele-
communications Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218
(1994), he pronounced that the word "modify" obviously meant "to change
slightly," and could not simply to mean "to change." Id. at 225. If it meant the
latter, he explained, one would always have to add an adjective (such as "signifi-
cantly" or "somewhat") before the word "modify" to give it an exact meaning.
The day I taught this case in my Legislation class, I told my students I was planning
to modify the syllabus for the class. I then asked them what they thought I meant.
The students presumed I was planning to change the case readings, but they pre-
sumed I would still be teaching Legislation and not Torts. But several students
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to imagine alternative meanings for a word, and of course, courts
may not simply delete words from a statute.92 But, in many situa-
tions, I believe courts are obliged to give meaning to words in light
of the underlying purpose of the legislation in which those words
are found. Depending on the situation, it may be appropriate for a
court to use the "specific intent" of the enacting legislature (i.e.,
what the legislature specifically intended when it used particular
words, if the legislature had a specific intent), the "general intent"
of the enacting legislature (what general goal the legislature was
seeking to achieve through passage of the legislation), or the "meta-
intent" of the enacting legislature (what interpretation is most con-
sistent with the legislature's general purpose, assuming the legisla-
ture could have known the impact of intervening judicial decisions
or societal changes). 93
I believe one can interpret existing sex discrimination laws to
prohibit discrimination based on transgender status, sexual orienta-
tion, and gender non-conformity under a legal process theory of
statutory interpretation. To do so, however, one must believe it is
appropriate to interpret words in light of a general purpose of the
enacting legislature, and one must divine such a purpose in sex dis-
crimination law. This does not seem, to me, particularly difficult.
One could well imagine that the general purpose of a sex discrimi-
nation law is to create a world in which the "natural order" that
presumes women and men must act in certain ways (e.g., with re-
gard to dress, sexual attraction, consistency to sex at birth) must
give way to a world in which equality for all is the norm.94 Indeed,
the Court of Justice of the European Communities, in P. v. S. and
Cornwall County Council, articulated a purpose along these lines
wanted to know if I was planning to change the readings "a lot" or "a little." That
seemed to indicate to me that the word "modify" does not inherently mean
"change a little."
92 A court may legitimately change the reading of a statute only when the
plain meaning of the statute would create an absurd result. But the "absurd re-
sult" standard is a very high one. The fact that a judge believes a legislature has
adopted a poor public policy should not be confused with a judicial conclusion that
the statute creates an "absurd result."
93 This last approach is, as I understand it, the essence of "dynamic statutory
interpretation." See Eskridge, supra note 92.
94 Thus, it is not even necessary to go to a "meta-intent" of a legislature to
construe sex discrimination laws as including protection for transgender people
and gay people.
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when it held that a Council Directive prohibiting sex discrimination
covered discrimination based on gender reassignment. 95
But a strict textualist approach might work as well (or even
better) for those seeking to achieve broad protection for gay people
and transgender people. Under such an approach, the intent of the
enacting Congress (or state legislature) is not as important as the
words the legislature chose to use. As Judge Grady observed in his
ruling in favor of Karen Ulane in 1984: "We not only got an act
[Title VII] including race discrimination, which he [the Southern
senator who added sex] had sought to bar, but we got sex as well.
The question we are confronting here today is: What did we get
when we got sex?"' 96 From a textualist perspective, there should be
no reason to believe we did not achieve protection for people who
change their sex, protection for people who love someone of the
same sex, and protection for people who do not meet societal ex-
pectations of sex. 97
Of course, in practice, litigators and courts will probably use a
mix of methodologies in arguing and deciding cases. Indeed, it
should come as no surprise that advocates in litigation and legisla-
tive arenas often use whatever methodology best serves their goals.
Neither conservatives nor liberals have a monopoly on this way of
doing business. Nevertheless, I believe it behooves us to be aware
of what methodology we are adopting and to be cognizant of the
implications of that methodology.
95 "The principle of equal treatment 'for men and women' to which the di-
rective refers in its title, preamble and provisions means, as Articles 2(l) and 3(1)
in particular indicate, that there should be 'no discrimination whatsoever on
grounds of sex.' Thus, the directive is simply the expression, in the relevant field,
of the principle of equality, which is one of the fundamental principles of Commu-
nity law ..... Accordingly, the scope of the directive cannot be confined simply to
discrimination based on the fact that a person is of one or other sex. In view of its
purpose and the nature of the rights which it seeks to safeguard, the scope of the
directive is also such as to apply to discrimination arising, as in this case, from the
gender reassignment of the person concerned." (emphasis added). See P. v. S. &
Cornwall County, Case C-13/94, 2 C.M.L.R. 247, 263 (1996).
96 See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821. 822 (N.D.III. 1983),
rev'd by Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F. 2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
97 See generally, Robert Wintemute, Recognising New Kinds of Direct Sex
Discrimination: Transsexualism, Sexual Orientation and Dress Codes, 60 MOD. L.
REV. 334 (1997).
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CONCLUSION
It is time for gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals to start thinking
seriously about using gender law to prohibit discrimination based
on sexual orientation. I understand gay rights litigators might well
feel apprehensive about making such claims, given the adverse re-
action of courts to such claims in the 1970s and 1980s. But our trans
brothers and sisters have been leaders in reinvigorating sex discrim-
ination law to prohibit discrimination against gender non-conform-
ity. Now it is up to us to open our eyes and figure out how we can
both help advance the struggle and benefit from it. At a minimum,
our work must include a concerted joint effort on both the litigation
and legislative fronts. Let us do work that Art Leonard will be
proud to record over the next twenty years.
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APPENDIX A
STATEMENT OF CHAI FELDBLUM RE:
ENDA AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
TRANSGENDERED PEOPLE
I am an Assistant Professor of Law at Georgetown University
Law Center in Washington, D.C., where I direct a Federal Legisla-
tion Clinic and where I have taught, among other things, Sexual
Orientation and the Law. I have also served as legal consultant to
the Human Rights Campaign Fund (HRCF) since January 1993. In
that capacity, I served as the lead lawyer, within the advocacy com-
munity, for the drafting and negotiating of the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 1994 (ENDA 1994) and subsequently of
ENDA of 1995.
I am writing this statement because there appears to be signifi-
cant misunderstanding about the decision not to include within
ENDA a prohibition against discrimination on the basis of gender
identity. I use as the basis for this response the various flyers and
internet notices posted by the Transsexual Menace, but I have also
benefited greatly from a conversation I had with Phyllis Frye and
other transgender activists in October 1994 at the Lavender Law
conference in Portland, Oregon. Unfortunately, I now find that
that conversation is used on flyers and postings to create distorted
quotes on my part, but perhaps this statement will clear up those
distortions.
As a starting point, I think it is excellent to have a conversation
about this issue because I believe our unified goal should be the
same: solid, uniform, federal legal protection against any form of
discrimination that occurs because a person is gay, lesbian, hetero-
sexual, bisexual or transgendered. Another way of saying this is:
solid, uniform, federal legal protection against discrimination
whether that discrimination is based on sexual orientation or on
gender identity.
It is a mistake, in this context, however to focus exclusively on
decisionmaking on the part of HRCF. One of the most dramatic
changes in the political landscape in Washington, D.C. over the past
two years has been the development of a real civil rights coalition,
encompassing many groups, in support of gay rights - and specifi-
cally, in support of ENDA. The existence and nurturance of that
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coalition is one of the most important achievements of the past
years, and it is one of the main elements that will help us to achieve
significant successes in the future. We still have more difficulty in
forming and holding our coalitions than do women or racial minori-
ties, but the two-year process in which ENDA was formed repre-
sents a sea change in coalition politics. Assuming that HRCF on its
own could ever unilaterally make any decision regarding the sub-
stantive content of ENDA is a throwback to a previous era when
we had no coalition partners and we were, indeed, on our own.
ENDA, as it was agreed to by the coalition, prohibits only dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation, including perceived sexual
orientation. Thus, if a transgendered person is discriminated
against in employment (or in the terms or conditions of employ-
ment) because that person is gay, lesbian, bisexual or heterosexual,
that employment action may be challenged under ENDA. In addi-
tion, if a transgendered person is discriminated against in employ-
ment because that person is perceived to be gay, lesbian, bisexual,
or heterosexual, that employment action may be challenged under
ENDA.
The gap in ENDA is the following: if a transgendered person is
discriminated against because he or she is transgendered - i.e., if
he or she wishes to, is in the process of, or has completed the pro-
cess of changing his or her gender - that employment action may
not be challenged under ENDA. In other words, discrimination on
the basis of gender identity, as opposed to discrimination on the
basis of "sexual orientation," is not prohibited by ENDA.
This basic legal fact explains why some of the rhetoric from the
Transsexual Menace's flyers and postings is misleading. Contrary to
the implications from those statements, adverse employment ac-
tions against butch dykes and femme dykes, effeminate fairies and
fag hags are all potentially covered under ENDA. The limitation is
that the adverse action must be the result of that person's sexual
orientation and not the result of some other factor that would be
uniformly applied to all employees regardless of the person's sexual
orientation.
The fact that there is no federal law that explicitly and clearly
prohibits gender identity discrimination is significant and unfortu-
nate. There is hurtful and harmful discrimination that occurs
against transgendered people. Indeed, in my mind, transgendered
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people are often more vulnerable to discrimination than many gay
people who are able to (and who choose to) "pass" as straight.
The experience faced by some transgendered people is not un-
like the differential experience that butch dykes face as compared
to femme dykes, or that effeminate gay men face as compared to
macho gay men. A butch dyke is covered under ENDA just as
much as a femme dyke is. But unless the femme dyke makes it
clear (through comments, or a picture of a lover on a desk, or
through whatever means) that she is a lesbian (as I do, often), the
butch dyke will always be more vulnerable to discrimination as a
result of her sexual orientation. This is not because the butch dyke
is "less covered" under ENDA or because she is "more lesbian,"
but simply because she cannot pass as easily.
Transgendered people are similarly more vulnerable to dis-
crimination and they encounter it often. That discrimination does
not necessarily occur because of their sexual orientation (although,
if it does, that discrimination Would be covered under ENDA), but
because of their desire to change their gender identity.
One way to address this discrimination would be to expand
ENDA so that discrimination on the basis of gender identity, as
well as discrimination based on sexual orientation, would be pro-
hibited. Indeed, early on in the drafting of ENDA (over two years
ago), that suggestion was made. The suggestion was also made that
ENDA should prohibit marital status discrimination, since such dis-
crimination also has an adverse impact on gay people; that ENDA
should cover all religious organizations; and that ENDA should re-
quire provision of domestic partner benefits.
The suggestion to include protection against gender identity
discrimination only works to achieve real protection, however, if
such a provision makes it through the entire Congressional process
and becomes part of the final version of the law. The same fact is
true for all the other suggestions made above.
The quote attributed to me about the inclusion of gender iden-
tity discrimination in ENDA "costing" advocates of the bill "twenty
votes" seems to be derived from a mistaken understanding of this
political reality - which I apparently failed to make sufficiently
clear in my conversation with Phyllis and others last October. (The
irony, of course, is that anyone who knows me knows I never count
votes. My job is to research and write the substance; I leave vote-
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counting to my very able colleagues who are lobbyists and Congres-
sional staffers.)
Certainly, if a prohibition on gender identity discrimination
were part of ENDA, various opponents would distort the practical
impact of that provision and use it to whip up frenzied opposition to
the bill - and that frenzy would impact adversely on ENDA. No
doubt. That is true, as well, with regard to coverage of religious
institutions and mandated partner benefits. But the more relevant
political point is that given the current state of affairs in Congress
(now and, probably, for the likely future), it is quite unlikely that
such provisions would ever remain in ENDA. Thus, the final, sub-
stantive result would be that Congress would explicitly reject a pro-
vision prohibiting gender identity discrimination (or covering
religious institutions or mandating benefits) - and the initial inclu-
sion of the provision and/or the battle to retain it would still affect
ENDA adversely.
Apart from this political fact, in which prohibition of gender
identity discrimination faced hurdles similar to other provisions we
wanted, there is an additional legal/strategic consideration to weigh
if we are to "keep our eyes on the prize" of attaining real, solid
protection against this form of discrimination.
As I noted above, the discrimination we are seeking to prohibit
is gender identity discrimination against transgendered people, not
sexual orientation discrimination against transgendered people.
(The latter discrimination would be prohibited by ENDA if and
when the bill became law.) But the fact is we already have an ex-
isting federal law, and numerous state laws, that prohibit "sex" dis-
crimination by private employers. (The federal law is Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the state laws tend to be patterned on
this federal law.) Unfortunately, the federal judges, in their "infi-
nite wisdom," have almost uniformly rejected the argument that
"gender identity" discrimination is a form of "sex" discrimination.
That argument, however, seems intuitively correct to me - and one
that we should pursue. Indeed, in a recent 1995 New York state
case, the judge soundly rejected the reasoning of a line of federal
cases that had rejected claims brought by transgendered people and
concluded instead that discrimination on the basis of gender iden-
tity was indeed prohibited by the city's gender discrimination law.
The key point is that the U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled
on this precise question nor have a significant number of the federal
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appeals courts and state courts. So, we should be doing everything
we can to argue that sex discrimination does include gender identity
discrimination under these existing laws. This makes sense from a
purely pragmatic perspective: Title VII and state laws are laws we
currently have - as compared to ENDA which is a bill we certainly
assume will become law, but probably will not for at least a few
years. Thus, to the extent we are able to derive protection against
gender identity discrimination from existing laws, the better off we
are.
The existence of Title VII and state laws, and the potential for
making the argument that gender identity discrimination is covered
under those laws, means the decision whether or not to include gen-
der identity discrimination in ENDA carries significant legal/strate-
gic implications. If ENDA had included a provision upon
introduction that covered gender identity discrimination (or if
ENDA were amended now to include such a provision and reintro-
duced), the bill would obviously be around Congress for a while
before it would be considered by a Committee or by the full Senate
or full House (which is when the provision could be struck). Dur-
ing this time period, some courts might use the fact that Congress
has included this provision in ENDA as demonstrating a legislative
intent that gender identity discrimination is not already part of the
existing Title VII (because if it is, why would Congress bother with
a new provision in a separate law?) This negative implication would
run directly counter to what we should be trying to achieve in the
courts through litigation under Title VII and comparable state laws
- that is, arguing that such coverage already exists.
This potential scenario only gets worse if and when the gender
identity provision is actually struck from ENDA. At that point, not
only will such discrimination not be covered under ENDA, but the
courts can then use that action as direct evidence that Congress ob-
viously doesn't want to prohibit such discrimination. Again, this
will work against any possible strategy of trying to achieve such
protection from existing sex discrimination laws.
This is all to say that this issue is a lot more complicated than
an assertion that "HRCF does not know how to spell i-n-c-l-u-s-i-o-
n." Not only does this assertion reflect a lack of understanding of
the importance and strength of today's coalition movement, it also
misses the nuances of a complicated legal decision.
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I believe there are several efforts HRCF and the trans-
gendered community could and should work on together - includ-
ing devising a long-term legal and political approach for achieving
protection against gender identity discrimination under existing
laws. The fact that the judicial trend has been to the contrary
doesn't mean the trend cannot and should not be turned around.
But to do so will require effective coordination with a range of
groups, including women's groups. And, to do so, the Transsexual
Menace and other transgender advocates will need to engage seri-
ously in an effort to develop a strategy - rather than simply engage
in HRCF-bashing.
I hope this statement can be useful in starting us towards a
productive effort to achieve solid, uniform federal protection
against discrimination on the basis of gender identity.
July 28, 1995
Washington, D.C.
666 [Vol. XVII
2000] GAY PEOPLE, TRANS PEOPLE, WOMEN 667
APPENDIX B
POTENTIAL GENDER IDENTITY AMENDMENTS
FOR ENDA
I. INTRODUCTION
Proposed gender identity amendments to the Employment
Non Discrimination Act of 1995 (ENDA) would prohibit covered
employers from discriminating on the basis of actual or perceived
gender identification or expression. The amendments would also in-
clude an affirmative duty for employers to provide reasonable ac-
commodations in certain instances.
ENDA is patterned on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
prohibiting discrimination by covered employers on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prohib-
iting employment discrimination based on disability. Thus, Title
VII, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act have been used as the bases for
the proposed amendments.
II. PROPOSED GENDER IDENTITY COVERAGE PROVISIONS
A. Add "or Gender dentity" Language
A BILL To prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation or gender identity.
SEC 2. DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED. A covered en-
tity, in connection with employment or employment opportu-
nities, shall not -
(1) subject an individual to different standards of treat-
ment on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity;
(2) discriminate against an individual based on the sexual
orientation or gender identity of persons with whom such indi-
vidual is believed to associate or to have associated;
(3) otherwise discriminate against an individual on the
basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.
SEC. 4. NO DISPARATE IMPACT. The fact that an employ-
ment practice has a disparate impact, as the term "disparate
impact" is used in section 703(k) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. 20OOe-2(k)), on the basis of sexual orienta-
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
tion or gender identity does not establish a prima facie viola-
tion of this Act.
SEC. 5. QUOTAS AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
PROHIBITED.
(a) QUOTAS - A covered entity shall not adopt or imple-
ment a quota on the basis of sexual orientation or gender
identity.
(b) PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT - A covered entity
shall not give preferential treatment to an individual on the
basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.
B. ADD "REASONABLE-ACCOMMODATION"
PROVISION
The new provision would require employers to provide reason-
able accommodations to transgender employees and applicants
with the limitation of undue hardship. Failure to provide reasonable
accommodations that do not impose an undue hardship would con-
stitute prohibited discrimination.
SEC 3. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION.
The discrimination prohibited in section (2) includes a refusal to
provide a reasonable accommodation to an otherwise qualified
applicant or employee, who may require such accommodation
based on the individual's gender identity, unless a covered entity
can demonstrate that providing the accommodation would im-
pose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such
entity.
C. ADD NEW DEFINITIONS
Gender identity, reasonable accommodation, otherwise quali-
fied individual, and undue hardship would be defined.
SEC. 18. DEFINITIONS. As used in this act...
(12) The term "gender identity" means having or being
perceived as having a self-image, expression or identity not tra-
ditionally associated with one's sex at birth.
(13) The term "reasonable accommodation" means modi-
fications to an employer's practices and procedures, including
those relating to common employee areas, dress codes and work
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reassignments that enable an individual to achieve optimal levels
of performance consistent with his or her gender identity.
(14) The term "otherwise qualified individual" means an
individual who, with reasonable accommodation if necessary,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position
such person holds or desires.
(15) The term "undue hardship" has the meaning given
such term in section 101(10) of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.A ss 12101 et seq.).
III. EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED LANGUAGE
A. GENDER IDENTITY
The term "gender identity" is defined in the proposed amend-
ments to mean having or being perceived as having a self-image,
expression or identity not traditionally associated with one's sex at
birth. This definition is intended to include pre-operative and post
operative transsexuals, bigendered people, and cross-dressers. In
addition, this definition will reinforce the protections already in
ENDA for mannish women, effeminate men, and androgynous
people.
Amendments addressing gender identity are necessary because
Title VII has not been interpreted, although it should be, to forbid
such discrimination.1 Minnesota is the only state that has a law
which forbids discrimination based on sexual orientation as defined
as heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, and transsexuality.
In addition, the cities of San Francisco and Santa Cruz California;
Seattle Washington; Cedar Rapids, Iowa; and Minneapolis and St.
Paul, Minnesota, have municipal ordinances that specifically pro-
tect individuals from discrimination based on their gender identity
or expression. The proposed definition is derived from a definition
considered in developing a similar law in Maryland that would pro-
hibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity.
I See e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984);
Kirkpatrick v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 636 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 198 1); Sommers v.
Budget Mktg, 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1981); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co.,
566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977); Grossman v. Bernards Township Bd. of Ed. 538 F.2d
319 (3rd. Cir. 1976); Richard Green, Spelling 'Relief for Transsexuals: Employment
Discrimination and the Criteria of Sex, 4 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 125.
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Constitutionally speaking, several of the courts have rejected
transsexuals as a "suspect "class. Thus, although the standard
should be higher, any law which discriminates against transsexuals
must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose to
pass constitutional muster under the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.2
B. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
The definition of reasonable accommodation, otherwise quali-
fied individual, and undue hardship in these amendments are pat-
terned after the ADA.
1. Reasonable Accommodation Requirement
A reasonable accommodation is a modification to enable an
otherwise qualified individual to perform the essential functions of
the job in question. For instance, the fact that an individual is a
male-to-female employee would not affect "her" ability to serve
food in a restaurant. However, such individual may not be able to
wear a traditional male's uniform. In such circumstance, allowing
the birth-male transgender waiter to wear a female's uniform would
be a required reasonable accommodation.
Exceptions to otherwise permissible grooming codes are likely
to be a commonly requested reasonable accommodation. 3 Trans-
2 See Doe v. USPS, Civ. Act. No. 84-3296 (D.D.C. 1985) Memorandum Op.;
Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
3 Grooming code exceptions are commonly litigated under Title VII. Title
VII requires employers to make reasonable accommodations on the basis of the
employee's religion. Thus, an employer must make an exception to his/her groom-
ing code for an employee who wishes to wear traditional religious garb. See Isaac
v. Butler's Shoe Corp., 511 F.Supp. 108 (N.D.Ga. 1980) (balancing the employees
goal of promoting a neat appearance against the employee's right to religious ex-
pression, the court held that the employer must accommodate the employee and
allow her to dress in accordance with her religious beliefs).
No-beard rules also create trouble with religious accommodations. Orthodox
Jews and Sikhs have challenged these on several occasions and tend to be success-
ful unless the nature of the business requires the rule. For instance, a court ordered
back-pay for whereas a computer-programmer who was forced to chose between
keeping his beard or quitting his job. However an employee who worked in a dan-
gerous environment was not able wear a beard because safety required him to
wear a respirator mask. Carter v. Bruce Oakley, Inc., 849 F.Supp. 673 (E.D.Ark.
1993); Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Kohli
v. Looc, Inc., 654 A.2d 922 (Md. Ct. App. 1995) (Sikh employee has the right to
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gender individuals often dress in accordance to a sex not tradition-
ally associated with their birth. In other words, many people who
are considered male at birth identify with the feminine gender and
prefer to dress as women. Furthermore, in the year before a sex-
change operation, doctors require the patient to live as a member of
the desired sex.
Transgender employees will be able to dress as a member of
the opposite sex, so long as they dress appropriately in accordance
with the grooming code for the desired sex. For instance, if a birth-
sex male transvestite wished to work as a flight attendant, while the
biological male should be allowed to dress a female, she must still
wear the required flight attendant's uniform. In other words, under
the reasonable accommodation provision the biologically male
transvestite should be entitled to wear a female's uniform, but the
term "reasonable" (which means effective) means the employee is
not entitled to wear any attire of her choosing.
2. Undue Hardship Limitation
The proposed amendments incorporate the ADA's balancing
test for undue hardship. The ADA defines undue hardship in terms
of "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense," and sets
up a balancing test that requires weighing: (1) the nature of the
required accommodation; (2) the overall financial resources of the
business and the number of its employees; (3) the impact of the
accommodation on facility operations; and (4) the type of
operation.4
The undue hardship limitation applies to both the financial and
operational components of the employer's business. It takes into
account the nature and size of the business and the cost and effect
of the providing the accommodation. Thus, a request for an em-
ployer to install a separate bathroom for the transgender individual
is likely to be an undue hardship. By contrast, requiring an em-
ployer to install locks on the current separate sex bathroom doors
and changing to lockable unisex rest-rooms would probably not be
an undue hardship.
wear beard despite food business employer's interest in a clean business-like
appearance).
4 42 U.S.C.A. s 12111(10) (1991).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVII
The same analysis applies to locker-rooms. While an employer
is not likely to have to install a separate locker-room for the trans-
gender employee, allowing him/her some other space to change and
store his/her clothing is not likely to cause an undue hardship for an
employer. Additionally, a transgender employee may request reas-
signment to a vacant position. Where the individual is qualified for
the position and reassignment will not interfere with an otherwise
lawful seniority system, it would not be an undue hardship for an
employer to transfer the employee. Allowing the employee to dress
in manner typically associated with the opposite sex typically will
not be an undue hardship. The effect on the morale of other em-
ployee's is also not an undue hardship.
3. Requirement of Otherwise Qualified
A qualified individual is one who with reasonable accommoda-
tion if necessary, can perform the essential functions of the employ-
ment position that such individual holds or desires. This creates a
two-part process: (1) an evaluation of the demands of the job; and
(2) an individual determination of fitness for the job's demands.
Only individuals who can perform the essential functions of the job
are protected.5
The definition is designed to protect both employers and em-
ployees. The employer need not hire a employee who is not quali-
fied. Yet, the employee is only required to be qualified to perform
the essential functions of the job. For example, with the flight at-
tendant, if the employee were unable to perform the essential func-
tions of the job, the question of grooming codes would never arise;
the airline would have a legitimate reason (the employee not being
qualified) not to hire "him" in the first place. Once it is determined
that the employee is qualified however, the employer must allow an
exception to the grooming code.
5 42 U.S.C.A. s 121111(8). See also Lucero v. Hart, 915 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.
1990) (individual who could type 44, but not 45-words-per-minute on account of
her handicap was not "otherwise qualified" where the employer required all secre-
tarial employees to type at 45).
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APPENDIX C
MEMORANDUM
TO: Legal Roundtable Members
FROM: Chai Feldblum
Shannon Minter
DATE: September 11, 1997
RE: Title VII, ENDA and Gender Expression
The attached document, prepared by Dana Priesing of
GenderPac, surveys current employment discrimination case law
relevant to issues of gender expression and gender identity in the
workplace. Dana's document is designed to set out the "state of the
law" as it relates to workplace dress and grooming codes, sexual
stereotyping, and cases involving transsexuals under Title VII.
This cover memo summarizes where we think we are with re-
gard to protecting gender non-conformity in the workplace under
Title VII. In addition, we consider how some cases of gender ex-
pression discrimination might fare under ENDA.
Our goal for this segment of the Roundtable is as follows.
First, we would like to have a conversation about how well we think
masculine-appearing women and feminine men (gay and non-gay)
are currently protected in the workplace under Title VII if they suf-
fer adverse employment action because of their gender non-con-
formity. One might think the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in
Price Waterhouse would take care of this problem completely.
We'd like to talk about: a) what the possible limitations are in using
Price Waterhouse; b) why there are not as many cases as one would
expect using Price Waterhouse to challenge gender conformity rules
in the workplace; and c) whether, as a litigation matter, gay legal
groups should be spending resources pushing the Price Waterhouse
envelope on gender non-conformity.
As a second and related matter, we would like to discuss
whether lesbians and gay men who are gender non-conforming will
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be as well protected under ENDA as lesbians and gay men who
appear more gender conforming. That is, without answering the
question of whether all gay individuals are, by definition, gender
non-conforming, we believe we can safely say that some gay indi-
viduals seem outwardly to conform to expected gender norms bet-
ter than others. So, for example, does ENDA, as currently drafted,
adequately protect a butch lesbian employee whose employer ar-
gues he has fired her not because of her sexual orientation, but be-
cause of her butch appearance? (I.e., the employer can point to
four femme lesbians and two macho gay men who have risen to
high positions in the company and who are openly gay in the
company.)
A brief comment on what this discussion is not: We do not in-
tend, or expect, this discussion to focus on whether gay legal groups
have a responsibility to litigate transsexual discrimination cases as
part of their definitional mandate. Both of us believe this is an im-
portant question for the Roundtable to address at some point. But
the discussion for this Roundtable is intended to be more limited, as
indicated by the description of the issues above.
To be frank, though, at least for me (Chai), my concern about
whether we are adequately protecting gender non-conforming
folks, under either Title VII or ENDA, has been informed by the
work I have done with members of the transgender community
over the past two years. My sense is that, even if we put aside for
the moment the question of whether discrimination against trans-
gendered people and discrimination against gay people are inher-
ently intertwined, there are necessarily common issues regarding
gender non-conformity that should be addressed by the
Roundtable.
So here goes ....
A. Title VII and Gender Expression
Assume a lesbian is fired from her job because she dresses and
acts too much "like a man." Under the Supreme Court's 1989 deci-
sion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins prohibiting the use of sex ster-
eotyping, this employee could have a viable cause of action under
Title VII. An informal employer "code" of acceptable behavior
that is different for men and women is precisely what was pro-
scribed by the Court in Price Waterhouse. Similarly, employer dress
codes that discriminate between women and men are based on ste-
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reotypes about how each sex should dress and, at least logically,
also should constitute sex discrimination under the rationale of
Price Waterhouse. Under Title VII, the only legal distinctions based
on sex that an employer should be allowed to make are those re-
quired by a bona fide occupational qualification.
As Dana's document indicates, prior to Price Waterhouse, fed-
eral courts generally upheld employer grooming and dress stan-
dards that differentiated between men and women, such as policies
forbidding men from having long hair or wearing earrings. The
courts held that hair length was not, like the person's sex itself, an
immutable characteristic, and that Congress intended to proscribe
discrimination against employees solely because of immutable char-
acteristics when it adopted Title VII. Thus, while these courts as-
sumed that an employer who required dress or grooming standards
for one sex only would be violating Title VII, they did not believe
that an employer who had different standards for men and women
was similarly violating Title VII.
In Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff (a heterosexual woman) was
denied a partnership in the firm in part because some of the part-
ners believed she was not sufficiently feminine in her grooming, her
dress and her manner. Finding this to be a violation of Title VII, the
Supreme Court wrote that "we are beyond the day when an em-
ployer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they
matched the stereotype associated with their group."
Although the earlier dress and grooming code cases upheld dif-
fering standards for men and women, the rationale of these cases
seems to us to be sharply limited by Price Waterhouse. The plaintiff
in that case, Ann Hopkins, did not have to demonstrate that her
failure to wear makeup or have her hair coifed (feminine improve-
ments suggested by one coworker) were immutable characteristics
that she could do nothing to alter. In the wake of Price Waterhouse,
courts should be more receptive to arguments that other instances
of discrimination based on employees' failure to adapt to certain
sex stereotypes violate Title VII and analogous state laws.
There are two problems that we see in this simple reliance on
Price Waterhouse. First, there have not been enough (if any!) pub-
lished cases that clearly establish the rule that forcing men and
women to adhere to the dress and appearance norms that are ex-
pected for their respective genders violates Title VII. Moreover, we
believe such a rule would also need to establish that there is no
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legitimate business reason for an employer to mandate gender con-
formity by its employees. That is, while an employer can force eve-
ryone in the workplace to dress "professionally," if a woman
dresses in the garb that is considered professional for the men in the
workplace, that should be fine. This rule has not been established
in any published cases we have found.
The only post-Price Waterhouse cases we have been able to
find thus far that could be helpful to our argument are summarized
in Dana's document, pp. 12-14. These cases essentially hold that an
employee cannot be harassed by coworkers for nonconforming
dress or behavior. A divided Seventh Circuit overturned a sum-
mary judgment for defendants and found that a male employee who
was harassed for wearing an earring and thus did not conform to
masculine stereotype could advance a sexual harassment claim
under Title VII. Doe v. City of Belleville. Also following the ratio-
nale of Price Waterhouse, a New Jersey court held that harassment
of a male employee perceived by coworkers to be effeminate is sex
stereotyping constituting sexual harassment under state law.
Zalewski v. Overlook Hospital.
The second obstacle to using Price Waterhouse to cover all the
situations that should appropriately be covered (and, obviously, a
subject for Roundtable conversation can be - what situations do
we think should be covered) is the "absurd result/slippery slope"
argument. As summarized in Dana's memo, most of the courts re-
jecting the "long hair" challenges by men based their ruling on the
"immutable characteristic" argument - which is probably pretty
weak after Price Waterhouse - or on the argument that Title VII
was intended to enhance economic opportunities for women - an
argument which is also pretty weak given the courts' application of
Title VII to men.
But the district court in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Pub-
lishing Co. based its ruling as well on the "absurd result" argument
that allowing men to have long hair would necessarily result in also
allowing them to wear dresses. That result conjures up for every
court the concomitant result of protecting transsexuals. And, to
date, every federal court has rejected the application of Title VII to
transsexuals claiming discrimination. In other words, those individ-
uals who actually cross sexual borders, or who seek to live as a
member of a gender different from the person's assigned sex at
birth, have not been protected under Title VII - even when the
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motivating factor in the adverse employment action has been dis-
comfort with the person's gender non-conformity in dress and ap-
pearance. In these cases, the courts have consistently held that
Congress intended a narrow, conventional definition of the word
"sex" in Title VII.
While most of the cases concerning transsexuals were litigated
before Price Waterhouse, the few that have come after have been
no more successful. None of these later cases, by the way, seemed
to have argued that the employers were engaged in invalid sex ster-
eotyping of one gender. (It is unclear how successful such an argu-
ment would have been.) In any event, this line of cases - and the
apparently strong desire of courts not to reach an "absurd result"
- pose some legal obstacles when considering how far federal
courts will go in using Title VII to protect employees who do not
conform to their expected sex stereotypes.
It should also be noted, however, that at least one lower fed-
eral court and one state supreme court have interpreted New
York's state anti-discrimination law - which is similar to Title VII
- as encompassing discrimination against postoperative transsexu-
als under sex discrimination. See Rentos v. Oce-Office Systems;
Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc. These courts held that the more
restrictive definition of sex intended by Congress did not apply to
state anti-discrimination laws, which could be interpreted more
broadly. Thus, part of our discussion should focus on whether we
think all courts will necessarily come to the same conclusion today
regarding coverage of transsexuals under Title VII.
ENDA and Gender Expression
Back to the hypothetical again: a lesbian is fired from her job
because she dresses and acts too much "like a man." But now as-
sume ENDA is law and employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation is illegal. The employer insists, however, that the em-
ployee is not being fired because she is a lesbian, but because she is
"too butch." As noted above, assume the employer can point to
three femme lesbians and two macho gay men who are openly gay
and merrily enjoying employment in this particular company.
Would the employee be protected by ENDA?
Some of us started a conversation about this type of hypotheti-
cal when we were considering whether the language in section 4 of
ENDA (prohibiting "different treatment or different standards"
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based on sexual orientation) might cause us some unexpected
trouble in litigating ENDA cases. But assume, for the moment, that
section 4 was rewritten to read just like Title VII. We think we still
may have a tough case here.
The employee could argue that dressing "butch" is part of her
sexual orientation, that is, her way of expressing her gender is an
integral element of her sexual orientation. On this theory, discrimi-
nating against her "masculinr" dress and manner would be the kind
of discrimination prohibited by ENDA.
This type of argument, however, has been rejected in a few
cases brought under state sexual orientation discrimination laws. In
these cases, the courts have construed the term "sexual orientation"
to mean sexual preferences and practices, i.e. the sex of the person's
sexual partner, and not the person's own gender expression or iden-
tity. See Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry Inc. (harassment aimed at
transsexual not the result of transsexual's sexual preference); Un-
derwood v. Archer Mgmt Services, Inc. (discrimination based on
transsexuality - "the medical condition of being transformed from
a man to a woman" - does not constitute a claim for sexual orien-
tation discrimination). Unless ENDA's definition of sexual orienta-
tion were amended to explicitly include modes of gender expression
(remember when it did say something about expression?), courts
may choose not to interpret ENDA's current definition of sexual
orientation as including discrimination based on dress or "acting
like a man."
In addition, there are some interesting conceptual questions
around defining sexual orientation as including a particular gender
projection. Shannon thinks a solid theoretical case can be made for
that; Chai is more uncertain about making that argument.
So, here are our views on the Title VII and ENDA questions
we pose above and to which we invite Roundtable response:
1) We believe Price Waterhouse has significant potential for
protecting gender non-conforming individuals in the workplace.
That is, if cases are brought in a strategic manner, we believe we
may be able to establish that Title VII protects employees who are
discriminated against for transgressing gender norms, including
dressing or behaving differently from the stereotypes suggested by
their birth sex. Workplace rules of behavior or dress that apply to
both sexes equally - e.g. all employees must act professionally; no
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employee may wear shorts at work, etc. - would continue to be
permissible. But employers would not be able to use workplace
rules to force a particular sex stereotype on any individual.
2) We believe there are not sufficient published cases out
there to feel comfortable that we have a strong Title VII principle
on which to depend for gender non-conformity protection. Given
that some significant percentage of gay people are gender non-con-
forming, we think some resources of the gay legal groups should be
devoted to developing a litigation strategy that would establish this
principle. Such a strategy should be developed in conjunction with
the women's legal groups - and such groups should be made to
feel invested in having Title VII protection established more clearly
in this area.
3) If, based on our current assessment of the state of the law
- or based on our assessment of the law after we try to bring some
cases - we decide Title VII, as currently written, will not provide
the protection we want, we should think about what changes in Ti-
tle VII's language might be appropriate to call for to adequately
address this issue.
4) We think that ENDA, as currently written, might have some
weaknesses in protecting gender non-conforming gay people. We
think a discussion of potential changes in ENDA's language that
would both help and be politically feasible is worthwhile.
NOTE: Thanks go to Joan Mulhern for her assistance in describing the state of the
law under Title VII for this memo. Joan, a recent Georgetown grad who has been
working with Chai on gay issues for the past month, has been wonderful in collect-
ing, reading, and analyzing these cases - in a very short time period.
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APPENDIX D
GenderPAC
gender, affectional & racial cquality
30 March, 1998
Chai Feldblum
Georgetown University Law Center
111 F Street NW
Washington, DC 20001
Dear Chai,
This will confirm your attendance at the roundtable on "Gender &
the Law" on May 4th at Skadden, Arps' Washington office.
To help several attendees who must be back in New York that
evening, we are moving the meeting's formal end from 5:00 PM to
4:00 PM. Of course, those of us who can'stay on will be welcome
to continue the discussion.
Also, enclosed is a copy of the Oncale amicus curiae brief
filed by LLDEF's Beatrice Dohrn and ACLU's Jennifer Middleton,
among others. This should help provide everyone with a more
de~ailed background to the case and its potential consequences.
Looking forward to seeing you there.
Yours truly,
4Rk chins
Gender Public Advocacy Coalition
212.645.1753
Kate Kendell
National Center for Lesbian Rights
415.392.6257
Tony Varona
Human Rights Campaign
202.216.1658
123 Moody SIrcc • Waltham. MA 02156 • 617-642-8571, • Gl c@GlIac,Org
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GenderPAC
gender, affectional & racial equality
List of Attendees
(as of 4/2)
American Civil Liberties Union
Matt Coles 212.549.2500 (tent.)
Jennifer Middleton 212.549.2500
American University Law School
Nancy Polikoff 202.274.4232
Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation
Mary Bonauto 617.426.1350
Gender Public Advocacy Coalition
Dana Priesing 703.578.0903
Riki Wilchins 212.645.1753
Georgetown University Law Center
Chai Feldblum 202.662.9595
Human Rights Campaign
Nancy Buermeyer 202.216.1505
Kevin Layton 202.628.4160
Tony Varona 202.216.1558
Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund
Beatrice Dohrn 212.809.8585 (tent.)
National Center for Lesbian Rights
Shannon Minter 415.392.6257
National Partnership for Women & Families
Donna Lenoff 202.986.2600
National Women's Law Center
Judy Applebaum 202.588.5180 (tent.)
NOW Legal Defense Fund
Julie Goldscheid 212.925.6635
Rep. Barney Frank's Office
Marcia Kuntz 202.225.5931
Robert Raben 202.225.6906
123 Moody Street " Waltham, MA 02156 • 617-642-8575 • GPac@GPac. Org
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APPENDIX E
National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force
Dear Friend,
Have you recently been denied service by a commercial establishment, been
denied a housing opportunity, or experienced harassment or discrimination at
work or in school? Do you believe that this happened because of your sexual
orientation or the way you express your gender? If so, the National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force and the Gender Public Advocacy Coalition would appreciate
your help in filling out the following questionnaire. It doesn't matter whether
you identify as straight, gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, intersexed, or
something else entirely. Of course, any information you provide will be
considered confidential and will not be used for marketing purposes.
In asking for your help with this project, we have two goals. First, we are
collecting information about these incidents to use in educational efforts directed
toward policymakers, coalition partners, and allies. Second, we are considering
whether "impact" litigation in this area might reduce the incidence of this type of
discrimination. We want to evaluate whether the incidents could be used as the
bases for civil rights litigation.
Please remember that this questionnaire constitutes neither legal advice nor a
formal complaint. If you believe that you have experienced discrimination, you
should promptly consult a competent attorney who can advise you of your
rights.
ThInk you for yourpssistance.
Nierrylo el
Na~tonaGay and Lesbian Task Force
Riki Anne Wilchins
GenderPAC
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GENDER BIAS QUESTIONNAIRE
SPONSORED BY
National Gay andand V Lesbian Task Force
mi n'ease tell, us about yourselL
1. Where do you live? City: State:
2. What is your age?
3. What is the sex stated on your driver's license or other current legal identification?
4. What is your sexual orientation?
5. What is your race and/or ethnicity? (Optional)
6. What is your employment status? (Check all that apply) 0 Unemployed 0 Self-Employed
Q Part-time Ul Full-time El Retired 0 Student 0 On Welfare EL On Disability
U1 Please answer a fewl questions for us about yourex eience.
7. Have you been denied a service (at a restaurant, bank, store, etc.) or been denied housing
based on: (Check all that apply)
O a perception that you were "too feminine" or "too masculine"?
FL your actual or perceived sexual orientation?
rl a perception that you were transgender?
What service?
Who denied you this service?
(for example, clerk, manager, wait staff, landlord)
8. Have you faced discrimination or harassment on the job (or while seeking a job) based on:
(Check all that apply)
El a perception that you were "too feminine" or "too masculine"?
0 your actual or perceived sexual orientation?
O a perception you were transgender?
If yes, what form of discrimination was it? (Check all that apply)
O Verbally Harassed 0 Demoted
O Sexually Harassed 0 Not Hired
o Physically Harassed 0 Not given an application
O Fired 0 Unfairly Disciplined
O Forced to Quit 0 Other:
o Not Promoted
G-,....A
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Gender Bias Questionnaire • Page2
Who harassed or discriminated against you? (Check all that apply)
O Supervisor, Manager 0 Other(s) (Please describe.)
O Co-worker(s)
Did you report the problem, and if so, to whom?
Did the employer do anything to remedy the harassment or discrimination?
O Yes O No
If yes, then what?
9. Have you faced harassment or discrimination at school based on: (check all that apply)
" a perception that you were "too feminine" or "too masculine"?
0 your actual or perceived sexual orientation?
" a perception you were transgender?
What type of harassment or discrimination was it?
O Verbally Harassed 0 Unfairly Treated
O Sexually Harassed 0 Other:
O Physically Harassed
O Unfairly Disciplined
By whom? 0 Student(s) 0 Teacher(s) 0 Administrator(s)
0 Other:
Did you report the problem, and if so, to whom?
Did any authority take action to stop the harassment or discrimination from
continuing? 0 Yes 0 No
If yes, then what action?
/ If you have experienced niore than one incident of a denial of 'seirice or housing, or
harassmeit or discrimination at work or school, please make clear in Answering these next
questions which incident you are referiing tob>Youh miiay feel it is easierto fill out more than
one survey if you have expirienced more than one-incident of discrimination or harassment.
10. Did the harassment/discrimination happen because you were perceived as ...
(Check all that apply)
QToo masculine in: 0 Clothing 0 Mannerism 0 Physical Appearance
0 Other (Please describe)
0 Too feminine in: 0 Clothing 0 Mannerism 0 Physical Appearance
0 Other (Please describe)
0 Inconsistent in how you presented your gender
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Gender Bias Questionnaire- Page 3
11. How do you know (or why do you suspect) that the discrimination occurred for the
reasons identified above? (Complete all that apply)
Q Verbal Statement(s). Please describe what was said as accurately as you can.
LI Action(s)/Behavior(s). Please describe what happened as accurately as you can.
El Written Document(s). Please describe what was written as accurately as you can.
rl Other. Please describe.
12. What was the entity that denied you a service or discriminated against you?
i Private Business. Name:
Li Organization/Association. Name:
Li Federal Government, State or Local Government Entity or Agency, including schools.
Name:
0 Other Type: Name:
13. What dates did the discrimination or harassment occur? Was it a one-time event or did it
continue over time? (Please estimate the date if necessary)
L One time. Date:
L Several times over a short period of time. From - to
" Continued over a long period of time. From - to
L Other. Describe, using dates when possible.
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Gender Bias Questionnaire Page 4
14. Have you or your representative(s) filed a complaint concerning the harassment/
discrimination? UYes Q No
If you answered yes,
a. Where did you file the complaint? (e.g. with the EEOC, a local human rights
commission, the company or school, etc.)
b. What is the current status of the proceeding?
15. Do you know someone (besides yourself) who experienced gender discrimination while
working for a state or local government employer?
E Yes 0 No
You are welcome to attach any document to this questionnaire
to give us a more complete story of what happened to you.
Thank you for filling-out this questionnaire All suriveyswill be kept strictly confidential.
16. If you provided details concerning any event of discrimination above, are you willing to
have the matter reviewed for possible further proceedings as a civil rights case at no cost to
you?
C No, I do not wish to be contacted. 0] Yes, you can contact me.
17. May we contact you to collect more information that will document your full story?
C No, I do not wish to be contacted. U Yes, you can contact me.
It you answered yes, please provide the contact information below so that we may get in touch with you if your
situation appears to meet our criteria. Your contact information will not be used for any other purpose.
Name:
Phone: _ (h) (w)
E-mail:
Any special instructions about contacting you? (Please describe)
Please return.Wis Suiey to either of the' follioimg.
NGLTF/Gender Bias Questionnaire., or., G enderPA /Gender:BiasQuestionfidire1700 Kalo'rama Road NW •.*. . ,-" daPC/eng, Bias Qu s onf. ire1 60kaido "N c iibaa Ptiesing,:
Washington, DC 20009-2624 733 15th Street NW, Suite-700
Fax: 202/332-0207 Wasigton, DC 20005..., ,
Ted oat c o =nna1 k.,es dkwW by l) Prt og dGerIerPAC and ia MOM oNat n GanesnTas Forc.
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APPENDIX F
APPENDIX A TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE
COMMENTS
BY LISA MOTTET
How "ON THE BASIS OF SEX" INCLUDES ACTION BASED ON
SEX STEREOTYPING
An analysis of Title VII case law and constitutional jurispru-
dence demonstrates that "harassment on the basis of sex" includes
harassment based on a student's perceived conformity or non-con-
formity to sex stereotypes.
The Supreme Court has ruled that the equal protection clause
of the federal Constitution prohibits sex stereotyping as a form of
sex discrimination. In almost all cases, the Court has stated this
prohibition in the context of stereotyping against groups - that is,
when a statute treats all men differently than all women based on a
stereotype of men or women generally. In some cases, however,
the Court has also protected individuals who do not conform to sex
stereotypes. The following cases highlight the Supreme Court's
early jurisprudence in the area of sex stereotyping:
" Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). The Court
struck down a provision of the Social Security Act that pro-
vided support for widows and their children, but only the
children of widowers (not the widowers). This differential
treatment was intended to allow the widow to stay home and
care for her children, while a widower was expected to work.
The Court held that, "such a gender-based generalization
cannot suffice to justify the denigration of the efforts of
women who do work and whose earnings contribute signifi-
cantly to their families' support." (420 U.S. at 645) (Protect-
ing a man who prefers to take care of his children instead of
working, and protecting a woman who works-both gender
non-conforming.)
* Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
The Supreme Court upheld a civil service scheme that pro-
vided preferences for veterans and had an unintentional dis-
parate impact on women. The Court concluded that the
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scheme was acceptable because, "nothing in the record dem-
onstrates that this preference for veterans was originally de-
vised or subsequently re-enacted because it would
accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a stereo-
typic and predefined place . . ." 442 U.S. at 279.
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982). The Supreme Court invalidated a women-only ad-
missions policy to a state-supported nursing school. The
Court explained that, "although the test for determining the
validity of a gender-based classification is straightforward, it
must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles
and abilities of males and females .... ." (458 U.S. at 725,
726). Continuing, the Court further explained that the
women-only admissions policy was flawed because it "lends
credibility to the old view that women, not men, should be-
come nurses." (458 U.S. at 730). (Protecting the gender non-
conforming male: the male nurse.)
By the time the Court addressed the issue of sex-based pension
plans under Title VII, the concept that sex stereotyping was illegiti-
mate had become well-accepted. In City of Los Angeles, Depart-
ment of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), the
Supreme Court concluded that a pension plan contribution scheme
in which women were required to contribute more to the pension
fund due to higher life expectancies violated Title VII. In dicta, the
Court referred to the issues of sex stereotyping:
It is now well recognized that employment decisions
cannot be predicated on mere "stereotyped" impres-
sions about the characteristics of males or females.
Myths and purely habitual assumptions about a
woman's inability to perform certain kinds of work are
no longer acceptable reasons for refusing to employ
qualified individuals, or for paying them less. (435 U.S.
at 707) (footnote omitted)
As noted, most of these cases dealt with sex stereotyping
against a group. However, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, decided in 1989, the Court was faced with a situation in which
an individual was engaging in gender non-conforming behavior.
The Court's analysis in that case remained constant and clearly set
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forth that under Title VII sex stereotyping is prohibited against an
individual as well.
Ann Hopkins was an "aggressive" female denied partnership
at an accounting firm. Partners in the firm had evaluated Hopkins,
both consciously and unconsciously, by considering whether she ac-
ted appropriately as a female. The Court explained in detail the
offending conduct:
There were clear signs, though, that some of the part-
ners reacted negatively to Hopkins' personality be-
cause she was a woman. One partner described her as
"macho" . . another suggested that she "overcompen-
sated for being a woman" . . . a third advised her to
take "a course at charm school" . . . Several partners
criticized her use of profanity; in response, one partner
suggested that those partners objected to her swearing
only "because it's a lady using foul language." . . . An-
other supporter explained that Hopkins "ha[d] ma-
tured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-
nosed mgr to an authoritative, formidable, but much
more appealing lady ptr candidate." . . . But it was the
man who, as [the lower court judge] found, bore re-
sponsibility for explaining to Hopkins the reasons for
the Policy Board's decision to place her candidacy on
hold who delivered the coup de grace: in order to im-
prove her chances for partnership, [the employer] ad-
vised, Hopkins should "walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-
up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." (490 U.S.
at 235).
The primary thrust of the Court's plurality opinion dealt with
the issue of mixed motives.' Indeed, that was the issue on which
certiorari had been granted. Nevertheless, the section of the opin-
ion dealing with the merits of Ann Hopkins' situation included a
clear articulation of how requiring women to act in a manner con-
Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in which she affirmatively
agreed with the plurality's treatment of sex stereotyping, making a majority of the
Court in agreement on that issue. 490 U.S. at 272. Justice White's concurrence
was silent on the issue, instead addressing the issues of mixed motives and
causation.
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sistent with sex stereotypes (e.g. women should not be aggressive) is
a form of sex discrimination under Title VII:
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are
beyond the day when an employer could evaluate em-
ployees by assuming or insisting that they matched the
stereotype associated with their group...
.. In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an em-
ployer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted
on the basis of gender. (490 U.S. at 250, 251) (empha-
sis added).
When the Supreme Court invalidated the male-only admis-
sions policy of Virginia Military Institute in 1996, United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, it clearly reaffirmed that a policy based on
gender-conforming view of women was invalid under the equal pro-
tection clause of the Constitution because it was sex discrimination.
As the Court explained:
"In contrast to the generalizations about women on
which Virginia rests, we note again these dispositive re-
alities: VMI's "implementing methodology" is not "in-
herently unsuitable to women," ... "some women...
do well under [the] adversative model," . . . "some
women, at least, would want to attend [VMI] if they
had the opportunity,". . . "some women are capable of
all of the individual activities required of VMI cadets,"
... and "can meet the physical standards [VMI] now
impose[s] on men" . . . It is on behalf of these women
that the United States has instituted this suit, and it is
for them that a remedy must be crafted . . ." (518 U.S.
at 550).
As this description of cases makes clear, when a policy is based
on sex stereotypes of a group, the policy is subject to challenge as a
form of sex discrimination. In addition, when a particular individ-
ual is discriminated against because he or she does not conform to a
sex stereotype, that too is subject to challenge as a form of sex
discrimination.
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APPENDIX B TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE COMMENTS
BY LISA MOT-TET
SEX STEREOTYPES - EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS
A. SEX STEREOTYPING PROHIBITIONS UNDER TITLE IX
The courts have evidenced a willingness to extend principles of
sex discrimination from Title VII and the Constitution to Title IX.
For example, the concept of sexual harassment was imported into
Title IX after being developed in Title VII. In the 1997 Sexual Har-
assment Guidance, the Department explains that it believes that Ti-
tle VII principles should be imported into Title IX, after making
appropriate adjustments for the different contexts -of private em-
ployment and education in general.1 This is consistent with Su-
preme Court practice, in which the Court has applied Title VII
principles to Title IX, after making alterations in the areas of notice
and agency. 2
There are, of course, differences between school and work set-
tings. For example, the Court noted, in Davis v. Monroe County,
that adjustment from Title VII principles are needed because "chil-
dren may regularly interact in a manner that would be unacceptable
among adults." (526 U.S. at 631). The Court then implied this
means that objectionable behavior will have to be more severe be-
tween schoolchildren before it is actionable. 3 Of course, another
very important difference between the school and work setting that
has yet to be addressed or recognized by the Court may make the
harassment worse for school children than employees: children are
in their formative years while in school, while adults at work have
1 Our relevant background for purposes of submitting these comments is as
follows: Professor Chai Feldblum is a professor of law at Georgetown University
Law Center, specializing in issues of civil rights. She has been involved in the area
of gender non-discrimination, in the legislative, administrative, and judicial arenas,
for the past twenty years. Lisa Mottet, a third-year law student at Georgetown, is a
research assistant to Professor Feldblum. For the past year, she has been exten-
sively researching the issue of sex-based harassment.
2 We wish to emphasize that in reality, these various aspects of harassment
are not separated out for the student experiencing harassment. This is a point that
should be clearly recognized in the Guidance. We are, however, separating out
these variables for our initial analysis.
3 Attached to these comments is Appendix B which discusses different sex
stereotypes and how they can operate in the educational context.
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likely reached nearly full personality development. When children
are teased into compliance with sex stereotypes, not only are they
robbed of educational opportunity, they are also robbed of their
chance to develop a personality and self-image that are unaffected
by sex stereotypes. 4 This process is sometimes referred to as "gen-
der policing," because the harassers are ensuring that the student
does not violate gender norms.
For the purposes of legal analysis, it is useful to set forth the
range of sex stereotypes that can be the basis of harassing behavior
in a school setting. We believe that harassment based on any of
these stereotypes is appropriately viewed as "harassment on the ba-
sis of sex" and therefore is prohibited by Title IX.
B. GENDER-POLICING STEREOTYPES - EXAMPLES AND THEIR
OPERATION
-Girls don't play sports (well).
-Boys are athletic, play rough and act tough.
-Girls wear girls' clothes, wear perfume, and style their long
hair.
-Boys wear boys' clothes and have short hair.
-Girls should keep their legs crossed, walk demurely, and
speak softly.
-Boys should take up space, strut, and be loud.
-Girls should not be aggressive.
-"Boys will be boys."
-Girls play with dolls, pay attention in class, and do their
homework.
-Boys play with action figures and trucks, goof off in class,
and don't do homework.
-Girls are emotional and nurturing by nature.
-Boys don't cry and are aloof.
-Girls are born girls and should want to continue to be girls.
-Boys are born boys and should want to continue to be boys.
-One's gender identity must be either male or female, and not
in between.
4 Attached to these comments is Appendix A which fully discusses caselaw
relating to how sex stereotyping is a form of discrimination based on sex.
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The above are just a few examples of possible sex stereotypes.
In any case where a student is harassed because of his or her non-
conformance to a sex stereotype, Title IX should prohibit such con-
duct. This is the clear application of the holding of Price Waterhouse
to the educational setting.
A good example of harassment based on stereotypes is a girl
who excels in baseball and is therefore targeted by her peers for
harassment. She might be harassed by taunts that she is "really a
boy," not a "real girl," or she may be physically assaulted with base-
balls being thrown at her or by having her bra snapped. Another
good example is a non-athletic boy with long hair and feminine
mannerisms. He may be harassed with verbal taunts insulting his
masculinity, or may have his clothing stolen from the locker room.
The harassment in either case may or may not explicitly accuse the
student of not conforming to a sex stereotype, and as in the exam-
ples above, may take a variety of forms. What matters to make the
conduct prohibited by Title IX is whether the student is chosen to
receive harassment because of his or her lack of conformity to a
stereotype.
Often gay, lesbian, and bisexual (GLB) students are not per-
ceived to conform to these sex stereotypes. These students may not
even be aware of their sexual orientation and often don't disclose
their sexual orientation to their peers. However, other students
may pick up on the GLB student's difference and choose that stu-
dent to harass because of his or her gender non-conformity. These
GLB students should be fully protected by Title IX and the fact that
the students are GLB or suspected of it should not matter.
Similarly, transgender students (who may because of their
young age not even be aware that they are transgender) will be
harassed in spite of the fact that they have not disclosed their trans-
gender status to their peers or have not begun to transition. How-
ever, the transgender student's visible gender discordance, or
deviation from sex stereotypes, often triggers severe peer harass-
ment. There are many sex stereotypes which concern the perma-
nence and the absolute, inflexible nature of individual gender
expression. For example, it is a stereotype that one's sex and gender
are permanently determined at birth. Some people are unsure
about their gender identity and some are sure that their biological
and mental sex are incongruent. Some students even insist that
they do not have a gender. These students need to be free from
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harassment while they are trying to determine what sex they feel
they are, during their transition from one sex to another, and while
they are in a period of gender-ambiguity. During all of these times,
a transgender student is deviating from sex stereotypes, and should
be protected from harassment based on them.
As noted above, sex stereotypes are enforced through a variety
of means, whether that be verbal sex-specific taunts or physical as-
saults, or any other creative harassment device. Another weapon
harassers regularly use against students who do not conform to sex
stereotypes is to accuse the victim of being gay, lesbian or bisexual.
All students who dare to deviate from these stereotypes, whether
they are straight or GLB, are at risk of subjecting themselves to
accusations of homosexuality. Studies have shown that being called
a fag/gay/dyke/lesbian is very feared by all students. In fact, for
male students, no form of form of harassment was feared more than
being called "fag," so much so that physical violence was preferable
to being thought of as gay.5 If the purpose of Title IX is to be real-
ized, children must be free to deviate from sex stereotypes without
this severe harassment being imposed. Since sexual orientation
harassment is one of the most effective weapons of sexism against
heterosexual and GLBT students alike, it should be prohibited by
the Title IX Guidance when it is operating to enforce sex stereotypes.
5 While we clearly agree with the addition of "sex stereotyping" to this sen-
tence and Guidance, we have two, perhaps picky, comments about this sentence.
First, the final phrase, "and is directed at individuals because of their sex," appears
to be redundant of the phrase "based on sex or sex stereotyping" in the middle of
the sentence. We recommend that the middle phrase replace the last phrase of the
sentence. Second, the use of the word "may" to indicate that there is a violation
only if harassment "rises to a level that denies or interferes with benefits, services,
or opportunities" should be eliminated because harassment based on sex stereo-
types is a form of discrimination based on sex under Title IX when it "rises to a
level that denies or interferes with benefits, services, or opportunities." Our rec-
ommended revision separates out two of the points this sentence makes: that har-
assment based on sex stereotypes is sex discrimination, and that Title IX is violated
only when the harassment is severe enough to deny educational benefits.
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APPENDIX G
December 13, 2000
Jeanette J. Lim
Office for Civil Rights
U.S. Department of Education
Switzer Building
400 Maryland Avenue, SW., Room 5036
Washington, DC 20202-1100
Re: Sexual Harassment Guidance Comments
Dear Ms. Lim:
We are submitting the following comments regarding the Of-
fice for Civil Rights' (OCR) "Revised Sexual Harassment Gui-
dance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other
Students, or Third Practices," 65 Fed. Reg. 213, 66091 (November 2,
2000) ("Proposed Guidance"). Thank you for allowing us to submit
these comments today, December 13, 2000, in conjunction with
those submitted by National Center for Lesbian Rights and Gay
and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders. 1
I. THE RANGE OF SEX-BASED HARASSMENT
The Department of Education has contributed significantly to
the protection of our nation's students through its promulgation
and enforcement of Title IX regulations and guidance. However,
we believe the Department limits itself, as well as the nation's stu-
dents, by artificially restricting the Guidance to "sexual harass-
ment," and distinguishing that type of harassment from what the
Department calls "gender-based harassment." We respectfully sub-
mit that, with just a few additions, the Guidance could easily cover
the range of sex-based harassment prohibited by Title IX. These
additions would not only more closely approximate the reality of
student's lives, but would also make the Guidance a more useful
guide for schools and educators.
1 65 Fed. Reg. 213, 66099 (November 2, 2000).
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There are two aspects of harassment that should be separated
for purposes of analysis.2 The first aspect is the motivation for the
harassment. Both harassment motivated by the physical sex of the
victim, and harassment motivated by the victim's perceived con-
formity or lack of conformity to sex stereotypes,3 meet the statutory
requirement of "on the basis of sex."'4 The Proposed Guidance, an
improvement over the 1997 Guidance, acknowledges this fact by
stating:
"It is also important to recognize that gender-based
harassment, which may include acts of verbal, nonver-
bal, or physical aggression, intimidation, or hostility
based on sex or sex-stereotyping, but not involving
conduct of a sexual nature, may be a form of sex dis-
crimination that violates Title IX and the Title IX regu-
lations if it rises to a level that denies or interferes with
benefits, services, or opportunities and is directed at in-
dividuals because of their sex. 65 Fed. Reg. 213, 66099.
(emphasis added) 5
The second aspect of harassment is the nature of the harass-
ment. Sexual and non-sexual harassment, when targeted at a stu-
dent based on his or her sex, are both equally capable of denying a
student the benefits of education. Whether or not a student is
harassed through sexual or non-sexual conduct should be irrelevant
to the inquiry of whether the harassment is severe enough to "deny
or limit, on the basis of sex, the student's ability to participate in or
to receive benefits, services or opportunities in the school's pro-
2 "In analyzing sexual harassment claims, the Department also applies, as
appropriate to the educational context, many of the legal principles applicable to
sexual harassment in the workplace developed under Title VII."
3 The Court has decided that notice standards and agency standards should
be more lenient for schools (likely because of their non-profit status and the fact
that public coffers are at risk). Another difference is that the teacher-student rela-
tionship is always prohibited, while relationships between coworkers, between stu-
dents, or between a boss and employee are not.
4 Davis v. Monroe County, 526 U.S. 629, 631 (1999).
5 Even if the child resists conforming to the stereotypes, he or she is still
being subject to harassment that he or she would not have been subjected to had
they have been the other sex (being perceived as gender conforming, the student
would not have been teased). See Section IV.
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gram."' 6 Indeed, many times relentless non-sexual taunts may be
much more effective than sexual teasing in denying a student bene-
fits of his or her education.
Based on the motivation and the nature of the harassment,
harassment can thus be divided into four types. Again, this division
is artificial for purposes of the reality of the student being harassed.
Since the Proposed Guidance explicitly chooses not to deal compre-
hensively with three of the four types of harassment, however, we
have separated them out so as to explain how all four need to be
acknowledged within the scope of the Guidance for the document
to be truly effective.
The first type of sex-based harassment is sexual harassment di-
rected at an individual because of his or her biological sex. The clas-
sic example of this type of harassment is a female student being
repeatedly subjected to unwelcome sexual advances from a male
student or employee. This type of harassment is comprehensively
covered by the Proposed Guidance.
The second type of sex-based harassment is non-sexual harass-
ment directed at an individual because of his or her biological sex.
This is what the Proposed Guidance labels "gender-based harass-
ment." As an illustration, the Guidance offers an example of a
group of boys repeatedly sabotaging a girl's lab experiment because
she is a girl. The Proposed Guidance asserts that a comprehensive
discussion of this type of harassment is "beyond the scope" of the
Guidance.
The third type of sex-based harassment is sexual harassment
based on a student's conformity or non-conformity to sex stereo-
types. In this situation, the victim is often chosen because he or she
is perceived as failing to act in accord with his or her biological sex.
The victim is then harassed through conduct of a sexual nature. For
example, a "masculine" girl may be groped by boys that want to
teach her "what girls are supposed to like"; or a "girly" girl may be
targeted for sexual harassment because the boys like her "femi-
nine" behavior. The Guidance does not expressly mention this form
of harassment at all, although the Department clearly did not in-
6 American Association of University Women Educational Foundation,
"Hostile Hallways: The AAUW Survey on Sexual Harassment in America's
Schools," 20 (1993). See also Massachusetts Governor's Commission on Gay and
Lesbian Youth, "Making Schools Safe for Gay and Lesbian Youth," (1993).
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tend to exclude such harassment, and indeed coverage of it could
well be implied.
The fourth type of sex-based harassment is non-sexual harass-
ment based on a student's conformity or non-conformity to sex ste-
reotypes. Like the third type, the victim may be chosen for either
conforming to sex stereotypes or for not conforming to them. In
either case, the victim is harassed in a non-sexual manner. For ex-
ample, a "feminine" boy may be called "wimp" and chased out of
the locker room. Again, the Proposed Guidance asserts that a com-
prehensive discussion of this type of harassment is "beyond the
scope" of the Guidance.
Here is a visual diagram of how we perceive the types of sex-
based harassment by motivation and nature of the harassment, and
how the Proposed Guidance treats each type:
FIGURE 1
Covered Not expressly
extensively mentioned
Sexual harassment Sexual harassment
based on physical based on sex
sex stereotypes
Non-sexual Non-sexual
'""- "eon~et~ndhescp~bt on hysical sex n sex stereotypes /
harassment base harasmenbne d bu
We understand that the Guidance is currently constituted to
focus on sexual harassment, that is harassment that is sexual in na-
ture. We are not recommending that the Department completely
revise this Guidance. Rather, we are asking that the Department
make two changes:
1. The Guidance should make clear that harassment of a sex-
ual nature may occur because of sex stereotypes as well as
because of physical sex, and explain what is meant by har-
assment based on sex stereotypes;
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2. The Guidance should have stronger language explaining
that non-sexual harassment also violates Title IX when
based on sex, and should explain that the procedures and
standards set out in detail for sexual harassment apply as
well to non-sexual harassment based on sex.
The reason for this latter request is simple. As we noted
above, dividing harassment based on sex into four types is an artifi-
cial endeavor that does not mirror the experiences of students. Stu-
dents are often harassed both due to their physical sex and their
perceived conformity to sex stereotypes, and this harassment
manifests itself in both sexual and non-sexual ways. For this reason,
it is critical that the Guidance explain that all harassment based on
sex, including based on sex stereotypes, whether sexual or non-sex-
ual, works together to create one experience of sex discrimination
for the student. The Guidance can be particularly helpful by ensur-
ing that educators do not receive the impression that these exper-
iences should be evaluated separately.
II. SPECIFIC LANGUAGE RECOMMENDATIONS
The following is a recommended version of the "Applicability
of Title IX" section.
Key:
Regular typeface is used for existing Proposed Guidance
Italics indicated recommended additions
Deleted text is indicated by strikethFeUgh
Text that was moved was not indicated
Applicability of Title IX.
Title IX applies to all public and private educational institu-
tions that receive Federal funds, i.e., recipients, including, but not
limited to, elementary and secondary schools, school districts, pro-
prietary schools, colleges, and universities. The guidance uses the
terms "recipients"' and "schools"' interchangeably to refer to all of
those institutions. The "education program or activity" of a school
includes all of the school's operations.[4] This means that Title IX
protects students in connection with all of the academic, educa-
tional, extra-curricular, athletic, and other programs of the school,
whether they take place in the facilities of the school, on a school
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bus, at a class or training program sponsored by the school at an-
other location, or elsewhere.
A student may be sexually harassed by a school employee,[6]
another student, or a non-employee third party (e.g., a visiting
speaker or visiting athletes). Title IX protects any "person"' from
sex discrimination. Accordingly, both male and female students are
protected from sexual harassment [7] engaged in by a school's em-
ployees, other students, or third parties. Moreover, Title IX prohib-
its sexual harassment regardless of the sex of the harasser, i.e., even
if the harasser and the person being harassed are members of the
same sex.[8] An example would be a campaign of sexually explicit
graffiti directed at a particular girl by other girls.[9]
It is important to note that harassment that is based on a stu-
dent's conformity or non-conformity to sex stereotypes is also harass-
ment based on sex. For example, if a girl is targeted for harassment
because she enjoys sports and is a "tomboy," or if a "feminine" boy
is harassed because he is not thought to be sufficiently "masculine,"
this constitutes prohibited harassment.
Although Title IX does not prohibit discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation,[10] [11] sexual or nonsexual harassment di-
rected at gay or lesbian students may does constitute sexual harass-
ment prohibited by Title IX if that harassment is based on sex or
sex stereotypes and is sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive. Fei
examaple, if s~tudenmts hec-kle nohr student ;Aith cotmments based
on the rtu~den;t's sexual orientation (e.g., "gay students are not wel-
come At thig ta-le, in the cafeteria"), but their a-ions d _no.t involve,
sexual conduct, their actions would not be sexual harassment coy
ered by Title IX. On the other. hand, har.assing conaduct of a4 sexu1
nature direcPted towiard gay or lesbian students (e.g., if a Male stu
dent or a group of male students, target a gay studet fOr physial
sexu-ial aRdVances) may rreate a sexually hostile evrnetad
therefore, ma be, prohibited by Tie !X.
It is important to note, however, that victims may be subject to
sex discrimination through harassing claims that they are gay, les-
bian, or bisexual. For example, instead of sabotaging a girl's lab ex-
periments in the example above, the boys may have called her a
lesbian (because she is a girl good at science or sports, or simply
because she is a girl). When sexual orientation charges are used
against a victim to harass based on sex, including sex stereotypes, that
harassment is prohibited, regardless of the actual (or perceived) sex-
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ual orientation of the victim. This is not harassment on the basis of
sexual orientation, but rather harassment on the basis of sex that uses
societal fears and stigma regarding sexual orientation to engage in the
harassment.
Although a comprehensive discussion of gender based harass
ment is bend the sco of this guidance .. It is also important to
recognize that gender based harassment nonsexual harassment,
which may include acts of verbal, nonverbal, or physical aggression,
intimidation, or hostility based n sex or se. stereotyping, may . is
a form of sex discrimination that violates Title IX if it is sufficiently
severe, persistent, or pervasive and directed at individuals based on
sex or sex stereotyping. For example, the repeated sabotaging of fe-
male graduate students' laboratory experiments by male students in
the class could be the basis of a violation of Title IX, if the harassers
have chosen the victim because of her sex. Although this Guidance
is meant to address sexual harassment, all of the (standards and pro-
cedures) provisions of this Guidance apply equally as well to nonsex-
ual harassment (e.g. notice to the school). In addition, sexual and
non-sexual harassment based on sex often appear together. In assess-
ing all related circumstances to determine whether a hostile envi-
ronment based on sex exists, incidents of non-sexual gender ba
harassment are to be combined with incidents of sexual harassment
coud ceaRte a hostile envi.4ronent-P, even if neither the gender-
based harassment alone nor the sexual harassment alone woul1.!d be
sufficient to do so. [13]
It is important to recognize that Title IX's prohibition against
sexual harassment does not extend to legitimate nonsexual touching
or other legitimate nonsexual conduct. For example, a high school
athletic coach hugging a student who made a goal or a kindergarten
teacher's consoling hug for a child with a skinned knee will not be
considered sexual harassment.[5] Similarly, one student's demon-
stration of a sports maneuver or technique requiring contact with
another student will not be considered sexual harassment. How-
ever, in some circumstances, nonsexual conduct may take on sexual
connotations and may be rise to the level of sexual harassment. For
example, a teacher's repeatedly hugging and putting his or her arms
around students under inappropriate circumstances could create a
hostile environment.
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Thank you so much for considering our comments. We hope
our research and analysis can be useful to you as you finalize this
document.
Sincerely,
Chai R. Feldblum
Lisa Mottet
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